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The study of intraweek share return patterns has received 
considerable attention in the field of international research. 
This research has shown that share returns tend to be higher than 
average on the last trading day of the week and lower than 
average on the first. This anomaly has come to be known as the 
Weekend Effect. 
Explanations proffered for this phenomenon have failed adequately 
to justify the pattern of returns across the weekdays. These 
explanations include settlement period delays, dividend effects, 
measurement error in share prices, institutional features and the 
tendency for firms to release unfavourable information over the 
weekend. 
This study investigates day of the week effects on returns of the 
All Share Index, Industrial Index and Gold Index on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The results indicate that the 
pattern of returns on the All Share Index has not altered 
significantly since Bhana's (1985) study. An above average 
Wednesday return and negative Monday return are still apparent. 
However, Bhana's study failed to examine returns on the 
Industrial and Gold Index. This study shows that the Industrial 
Index displays the same return pattern as the All Share Index. 
However, the Gold Index displays atypical behaviour with a 












The study improves upon Bhana's research by exploring for 
explanations to the anomalous behaviour. This is achieved by 
reproducing adjustments made to returns in international research 
papers. Returns are adjusted for uneven settlement delays and 
dividend effects. When settlement effects and dividend effects 
a-re adjusted for simultaneously, it is found that the All Share 
and Gold Indices display no significant day of the week effect. 
Settlement delays explain the Midweek Effect on the All Share 
Index, while a combination of the settlement effect and the 
dividend effect explain the negative Monday return. However, the 
Midweek Effect remains an unexplained anomaly n the Industrial 
Index. 
The study also shows that returns are generated in trading time 
for the All Share index, while neither the trading nor calendar 
time hypotheses provide an adequate explanation of the return 
generating process on the Industrial Index. However, both the 
calendar and trading time models are acceptable for the Gold 
Index. Thus it is clear that the return generating process is not 
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The purpose of this paper is to determine if the equity indices 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange exhibit similar empirical 
anomalies to those found on other international stock exchanges. 
These anomalies relate to non-random movements in share prices. 
The non-random movements, which have been widely documented and 
are reviewed in Chapter Two, indicate that the distribution of 
share prices is not the same for all days of the week. This 
thesis examines the distribution of share prices on the different 
weekdays by studying the closing values of the three equities 
indices1 • This study, like most other studies in this field, 
considers the day-to-day returns2 on the indices. Thus the 
distribution of share prices across the weekdays is empirically 
investigated by analyzing daily returns on the share or equity 
indices. 
These share market anomalies relate to the uneven distribution 
of day-to-day index returns across the weekdays. The most common 
anomaly noted on international markets is that Mondays exhibit 
a significant negative return, while Fridays exhibit significant 
positive returns when compared to other weekdays. This has come 
to be known as the "Weekend Ef ect". These observations are 
crucial since they appear to contradict the Efficient Market 
Theory. 
"The Efficient Market Theory holds that market prices 
fully and instantaneously reflect all available 
information. Zn this sense share prices are said to be 
'correct' and provide accurate siqnals for resource 
allocation." (Firth, 1986) 
Informational efficiency of share markets implies that all 
available information is fully and instantaneously reflected in 
the share price. Thus there is no delay between the time when 
information reaches the market, and is incorporated in the share 
price. Bad news has an immediate negative impact on the share 
price, while good news immediately causes the share price to 
rise. Consequently, it is not possible to consistently earn 
1The three equity indices that are studied are the All 
share, Industrial and Gold indices. 
2"Day-to-day returns on the indices" is defined as the 
difference between the closing value of the index on day t less 
the closing value of the index on the preceding day (t-1) divided 
by the preceding day's (t-1) closing value, multiplied by one 













excess returns, except by chance. It is important to note the 
words "consistently" and "chance" - it is possible to earn excess 
returns on the share market, but according to the efficient 
market theory this would be entirely due to chance. 
In an informationally efficient market, share prices change on 
the arrival of new information. However, if new information 
arrives randomly, share prices will be unpredictable. Since share 
prices are unpredictable, they behave as if generated by a random 
process. The random manner in which share prices are generated 
implies that it is impossible to derive a mechanical investment 
strategy that consistently outperforms the market. "The almost 
unanimous conclusion from academic research is that no mechanical 
investment strategies have been found which consistently earn 
excess returns after allowing for transaction costs that the 
strategy incurs." (Firth, 1986) In the case of the share market, 
these transaction costs relate to brokerage fees and security 
taxes. 
Many market participants claim that they receive objective buy 
and sell indicators which yield excess returns. In order for a 
trading strategy to violate the efficient market hypothesis, it 
has to earn abnormal returns on a consistent basis. Certain 
investors claim they have such a strategy or trading rule. For 
obvious reasons, they are usually not prepared to divulge such 
information, and consequently such claims cannot be 
substantiated. (One obvious method of testing such a claim would 
be to analyze the returns of the investor, and see whether the 
investor consistently earned excess returns.) 
1.1 Seasonalities 
A seasonality is a time period during which asset returns are 
above or below average returns on a consistent basis. Since this 
time period repeats itself, it is predictable. In an efficient 
share market, one would expect no recurring pattern of returns 
to exist. Should such a pattern of returns exist, it would be 
possible to invest at times when prices are expected to be low 
and sell when prices are high. These investors would be able to 
consistently earn excess returns, after taking transaction costs 
into account. In an efficient market the actions of such 
investors would eventually lead to the disappearance of these 
excess returns. This would be achieved since information about 
the seasonality and its excess returns would become available to 
other investors. Other investors would follow the same pattern 
of buying when prices are low and selling when prices are high, 
in turn causing prices to rise with an increase in demand for the 
share at the start of the seasonality, and to fall when investors 
sell at the end. Any excess returns would disappear in this 
arbitrage process. 
The existence of seasonali ties may contradict the efficient 
market theory. However, it is possible that such seasonalities 
are due to the behaviour of rational investors in the market 
place. Day of the week effects may be the result of the actions 












cause the returns of a particular time period to be consistently 
above average. For example, share prices may move based on the 
last day to register for a dividend. If this were not taken into 
account in the behaviour of share prices, it would distort the 
empirical results and create a day of the week effect. However, 
if no logical or rational reason for an inconsistency exists, 
then it is an anomaly and is by definition a contradiction of the 
theory. 
studies on the pattern of share returns across weekdays is part 
of the study of seasonali ties in general. However, it is 
necessary to briefly explain other seasonal effects, so as to 
obtain an understanding of where this thesis fits into the field 
of seasonalities. Many examples of seasonalities exist. studies 
indicating that share returns are traditionally higher in the 
month of January relative to other months of the year have come 
to be known as the January Effect (Maberly E. & Maris B., 1991). 
Other studies have observed share returns being consistently 
high on the days preceding public holidays as opposed to the 
returns generated on the other days of the week (Ariel, 1986. 
Fields, 1934). This has come to be known as the Public Holiday 
Effect. The Weekend Effect is due to the observation of returns 
(not only on the share market) being continually high on Fridays 
and low on Mondays. ( The terms "low" and "high" are clearly in 
relation to the average returns of the particular financial 
instrument being studied.) The Monday Effect is due to the 
observation of negative returns on Mondays. When the negative 
Monday return is combined with an above average positive Friday 
return, it has been termed the Weekend Effect. Both the Monday 
Effect and the Weekend Effect form part of the study of day of 
the week effects on share returns. 
1.2 The Generation of Share Returns 
Share returns ( for the moment ignoring return due to dividends) 
are the result of changes in the prices of shares over a period 
of time. In fact a return is, by definition, linked to a specific 
time period. It is not possible to speak of return without the 
notion of time. Thus one needs to consider how returns are 
generated and measured over time. Do non-trading days (e.g. 
weekends and holidays) contribute towards a share's return, or 
are returns generated solely during trading3 time periods? In an 
efficient market where share prices are generated in a random 
manner, one expects the distribution of daily returns to be 
generated by one of two processes. The first possibility is that 
returns are generated solely during times that the market is open 
for trade. This has been termed the trading time hypothesis 
(Clark, 1975). The other possibility is that returns are 
generated irrespective of whether the market is open or closed. 
This would imply that returns are generated over calender time, 
and has been termed the calendar time hypothesis (Fama, 1965). 
3Trading time period relates to the time that the market is 
open for trade. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange is open for trade 












Researchers investigating the generation of share returns have 
generally assumed that the distribution of asset returns follows 
one of the above models. Most researchers support the trading 
time model, assuming that the distribution of share returns is 
identical for all days that the market is open (Hess, 1981). 
However, "in recent years it has been found that the stock market 
returns in a number of countries (e.g. UK, USA, Canada, Japan, 
Finland, and Australia) are not completely random" (Board et 
al.,1988). The most common form of this non-randomness is that 
returns tend to be significantly higher on a Friday, and lower 
(sometimes even negative) on a Monday. Several studies have been 
conducted on these intraweek trading patterns, which has com~ to 
be known as the "Weekend Effect". 
1.3 Major results of previous studies 
The first paper to document an intraweek trading pattern was 
written by Fields (1931). He noted that, quite contrary to 
popular belief, share prices tended to rise prior to a holiday. 
This was the first formal evidence that share returns might not 
be the same on all days of the week. 
Cross (1973) examined the distribution of share price changes on 
Fridays and Mondays by examining changes in the Standard and 
Poors Composite stock Index. He documented a relationship between 
Friday and Monday share prices that indicated that the movements 
in share prices were non-random. His studies showed that the 
Standard and Poors Composite Stock Index performed better on 
Fridays than Mondays, both in terms of mean percentage change4 
and the percentage of times the index advanced5 in every year of 
the eighteen year study period. It was this non-random movement 
in share prices on Mondays and Fridays that came to be known as 
the "Weekend Effect". 
French (1980) examined the process of generating share returns. 
He tested the two alternative hypotheses - the trading time 
hypothesis and the calendar time hypothesis. Both of these are 
discussed in more depth in Chapter Two. His empirical results 
showed significant negative Monday returns. These results 
contradicted both hypotheses, since the trading time hypothesis 
postulates that returns should not be significantly different for 
any of the weekdays and the calendar time hypothesis submits that 
Monday's return should be three times as large as any other 
weekday. 
4Cross' mean percentage change related to the average return 
(as given in formulae {1} in Chapter Three) for that weekday. His 
article gives no formulae, but his results indicate that Friday's 
have a mean percentage change of +0.12% while Monday's have a 
mean percentage change of -0.18%. 
5Cross defined an advance on the index as an increase in the 
value of the Standard and Poors Composite Stock Index when 
compared to the preceding day. The index advanced on 62% of the 












At this point researchers tried to find an explanation to this 
anomalous behaviour in share returns. The two most important 
contributions related to settlement delays and dividend effects6 • 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) adjusted daily returns for the effects 
of settlement delays. The results provided a partial explanation 
(about 20%) to the anomalous observation of different daily 
returns. Board and Sutcliffe (1988) examined whether the 
anomalous behaviour could be explained by the effects of 
dividends. Their results indicated that dividends did influence 
daily returns, but not to the extent of the observed anomaly. 
1.4 The contribution of this study 
Only one published study on the Weekend Effect on the JSE exists 
(Bhana, 1985). The contents of this study are dealt with in depth 
in Chapter Two. However, one of Bhana's recommendations was "that 
follow-up studies on the effect of day of the week on the JSE 
should be undertaken as more computer-based information becomes 
available." This study proposes to fill this gap. Bhana's 
recommendation for a later study stems from the fact that his 
conclusions are based on only five years of daily data. 
International studies typically include at least twelve and a 
half years of data. This study gives us results over a ten year 
period and should serve to confirm or dispute the findings of 
Bhana. 
A unique aspect of this study's data is that it also includes 
time over which the futures market was introduced to the South 
African market. Thus the data is subdivided into two time periods 
- pre- and post-futures market introduction. In this manner it 
is possible to identify whether the futures market has had any 
influence on daily return patterns on the JSE. 
The study analyses the JSE's All Share Index, Industrial Index 
and the Gold Index. At the time of printing, the author is 
unaware of any study that has performed an analysis of the three 
different Indices. The Johannesburg stock Exchange differs from 
other international share markets due to the large influence of 
the gold shares on the All Share Index. It is possible that the 
day of the week effect may be distorted on particularly the Gold 
Index and to a lessor extent the All Share Index, due to the 
influence of gold shares. 
Bhana's study did not attempt to explain any possible reasons for 
the Weekend Effect. Numerous explanations have been offered in 
6Settlement delays ref er to the time delay between purchase 
date and settlement date. Daily returns need to be adjusted for 
the interest effects of such settlement delays, since the 
settlement period varies according to the day on which purchase 
occurs. Dividend effects refer to the fact that share prices will 
adjust downwards on the day after the last day to register(LDR). 
If the LOR consistently falls on any particular weekday, it will 
need to be adjusted for. Both of these adjustments are 












the studies of international share markets. None of these 
explanations have totally rationalised7 the Weekend Effect. 
However, these explanations must be taken into account in any 
study on the day of the week seasonality. This study performs 
various manipulations8 on the data so as to adjust for the latest 
possible explanations of differing returns for different days of 
the week. 
The Weekend Effect represents an anomaly which provides evidence 
contradicting the Efficient Market Theory. In the words of Board 
and Sutcliffe {1988) : 
"The non-randomness in stock returns apparently contradicts 
the widely accepted view that stock markets are at least 
weakly efficient9 for frequently traded shares. This 
challenges one of the central results of finance theory, 
and has therefore attracted considerable attention." 
As such it is important, since other studies10 on share markets 
have been based on the belief that returns are uninfluenced by 
the day of the week {Lakonishok and Levi, 1982). Seasonality 
studies on the share markets have shown these assumptions to be 
incorrect, and thus future studies on share markets must take the 
results of the "Weekend Effect" into account. {i.e. To base 
theories upon assumptions that are at odds with the economic 
reality, must lead to invalid theories. Thus any results and 
conclusions based on an incorrect assumption must call to 
question the validity of those findings.) 
If the share market is weakly inefficient, it may be possible to 
find an economically viable trading strategy based on day of the 
7International studies have found partial explanations to 
weekend anomaly. However, this is where these explanations stop. 
They only explain part of the negative Monday and high Friday 
return. Consequently, the explanations fail to totally 
rationalise the anomalous Weekend Effect. 
8For example, adjusting returns for the effects of uneven 
settlement delays and LOR' s which do not fall randomly across the 
weekdays {i.e. dividend effects). 
9The Efficient Market Theory is divided into three levels, 
weak form, semi-strong form and strong form efficiency, based on 
the type of information that is available to the potential 
investor. Weak form efficiency implies that no excess returns can 
be earned by utilising historical information regarding share 
prices and financial data. The three levels to the Efficient 
Market Theory are discussed in depth in Chapter Two. 
1°These "other studies" are NOT on seasonalities, but ARE on 
other aspects of the share market. One of the assumptions of 
these other studies has been that returns are uninfluenced by the 
day of the week. Seasonality studies on the share market has 












week share return patterns. on international markets, such a 
strategy would imply buying shares on a Monday and selling on a 
Friday. Previous studies indicate that this trading strategy 
would be unprofitable as a trading rule due to transaction costs 
(e.g. brokerage fees, security taxes etc.). However, this may not 
be the case in the South African share market. Even if 
transaction costs do make an active trading rule based on day of 
the week effects impractical, this information would still be 
valuable to an investor, who wishes to invest in shares for a 
period of at least one week. This would lead to a strategy of 
delaying purchases, that would have been made anyway until a 
Monday, and selling on a Friday. 
Another contribution made by this study arises due to the 
introduction of Index funds. (Index funds are similar to unit 
trusts, except that an index fund is "passively" managed needing 
only to replicate, or track, the underlying indices without the 
need for research-based and active selection of undervalued 
shares. ) Clearly, index funds will be extremely interested in the 
performance of the indices over the days of the week. Such a fund 
could gain tremendous financial advantage by merely delaying 
purchases to days traditionally associated with lower prices 
(i.e. Mondays) and selling on traditionally high price days (i.e. 
Fridays). It should be noted that such actions would eventually 
arbitrage away the potential advantage of purchasing or selling 
on any particular weekday, and no further day of the week pattern 
would be evidenced. 
Previous studies have adjusted for the effects of settlement 
delays by assuming interest rates to be equal across all 
weekdays. This is a convenient assumption, but it may be that 
interest rates also exhibit day of the week effects like the 
share market. This assumption would distort the adjustment for 
settlement delays. Consequently, this study proposes to adjust 
for settlement delays by using the daily interest rates. In this 
manner, any possible day of the week effects in interest rates 
do not create a bias in the adjustment for settlement effects. 
1.s Brief outline of this thesis 
Chapter Two contains a chronological review of the more important 
literature relating to share market seasonalities. The weak, 
semi-strong and strong forms of the Efficient Market Theory are 
discussed. In addition, literature relating to the trading and 
calendar time hypotheses is presented. Potential explanations of 
the Weekend Effect are offered, and discussion is made as to how 
they relate to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Additional 
comments are added so as to explain how problems encountered in 
other studies are dealt with in this thesis. 
As this study revolves around the JSE share indices, it will 
require a brief outline on the history of the indices, their 
construction and administration. This is presented in Chapter 
Three, along with a discussion of the data used. 












to be used in this study. This chapter discusses the statistical 
formulae, and an explanation of what these statistical models 
represent and hope to achieve. 
Chapter Four analyses the empirical results obtained from the 
performance of the tests described in Chapter Three. The results 
are presented in both a tabular and graphical format. An analysis 
of these results is also made in this chapter. 
Chapter Five presents a resume' of this study. It includes a 
summary of the significant results, and a discussion of the 
contributions to research made by this study. Inevitably there 
are areas that could not be adequately covered due to a shortage 
of data availability and limitations of scope of this study. 
Thus, suggestions as to where future research can improve and 














This chapter contains a literature review of research relevant 
to this thesis. Comments have been made on international studies, 
to explain how various problems encountered in these studies are 
addressed in the South African scenario. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the efficient market 
hypothesis. The efficient market hypothesis represents one of the 
central results of finance theory (Board and Sutcliffe, 1988). 
However, the various studies of research in the field of 
intraweek share returns, reveal an empirical anomaly that appears 
to contradict the efficient market hypothesis. This empirical 
evidence relates to abnormally high returns on Fridays and 
negative returns on Mondays. Various authors have tried to 
explain the observed anomaly with different theories. None of 
these appear to fully explain the observed anomaly, since after 
making adjustments for the theoretical explanations, a day of the 
week effect still exists. Researchers have thus investigated 
other international markets - including Australia, Japan and 
Canada, to determine if the empirical anomaly is limited to U.S. 
and U.K. Although the evidence suggests that the anomaly is not 
limited to western markets, the pattern of the anomaly does 
change when one looks at other international markets. Chapter Two 
concludes with a summary of the more important concepts covered 
in this chapter. 
2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market theory holds that share prices fully and 
instantaneously reflect all available information, including the 
risks involved in the investment (Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 
1993). Thus it is not possible to consistently earn an excess 
return1 • While unexpected events may lead to excess returns if 
the investor is lucky, the expected return may not be abnormal 
in an efficient market (Philpott, 1993). The theory has been 
divided into three levels of efficiency based upon the type of 
information that is available to potential investors (Fama, 
1970) : 
(a) Weak-form efficiency implies that no excess returns can be 
earned by utilising historical information (i.e. past share 
prices, trading volumes etc.) regarding share prices and 
financial data. The theory holds that share prices follow 
a random walk. "This implies that price changes are 
independent of each other, making it impossible to predict 















a future price based on a series of past prices" (Uliana, 
Correia and Wormald, 1987). Thus all share market 
information, from past share prices, volumes traded etc., 
is already reflected in the share price and it is not 
possible to earn excess returns from technical analysis2 
(Philpott, 1993). This study is based on an analysis of the 
closing values of share indices. The data is publically 
available and represents an historical picture of share 
prices. As such, the study will be investigating whether 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is at least weakly 
efficient. 
Semi-strong form efficiency holds that share prices 
immediately adjust to all new publicly available 
information and that the current share price is the best 
indicator of the risk-return relationship of a share. 
Consequently it is not possible to outperform the market by 
trading on this new information. This implies that it is 
not possible to consistently earn excess returns through 
fundamental analysis3 (Uliana, Correia and Wormald, 1987). 
Strong form efficiency implies that share prices reflect 
all publically4 and privately available information and 
thus it is not possible to consistently earn excess 
returns. (This means that it is impossible to earn excess 
returns even if you have advance knowledge of information -
Insider Trading. However, this seems unlikely to be true 
when you consider the number of cases being investigated by 
regulatory authorities, and the enormous profits that these 
'insiders' derive. ie Ivan Boesky.) 
If share markets are weak-form efficient, it would be impossible 
to exploit historical information to consistently earn excess 
2Technical analysis or charting is the process where future 
share prices are predicted using graphs depicting the history of 
the share price, trading volumes etc. The updated version of the 
efficient market hypothesis recognises the costs of gathering 
such information, and states that it is not possible to earn an 
excess return after taking into account the costs of gathering 
such information. 
3Fundamental analysis is the study of all publically 
available information (i.e. financial statements, prospects for 
the industry etc.) in the hope of discovering an undervalued 
share that will consistently yield the investor excess returns. 
4The most stringent definition of semi-strong and strong 
form efficiency would contend that only insider information 
differentiates between the two forms, being included in the later 
form of efficiency. However, a broader definition would regard 
proprietary information, obtained from highly sophisticated 
analysis, as not being publically available, and thus included 












returns. This implies that price dependencies5 cannot be 
exploited to derive any trading rules which consistently yield 
returns that are excessive in relation to the investment's risk. 
"The non-randomness in stock returns apparently 
contradicts the widely accepted view that stock 
markets are at least weakly efficient for frequently 
traded shares. This challenges one of the central 
results of finance theory, and has therefore attracted 
considerable attention." (Board et al.,1988) 
"The existence of seasonalities in stock markets represents an 
anomaly that financial economists are still seeking to explain" 
(Yadev & Pope, 1991). This paper proposes to establish whether 
such an anomaly exists on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. If 
such an anomaly is found to exist, the paper will investigate 
possible explanations to the anomaly. 
The seasonality anomaly has lead to a number of international 
studies and a limited number of South African studies6 • A review 
of these studies is presented below. 
2.2 seasonalities 
As discussed in Chapter One, a seasonality is a time period 
during which returns are above or below average returns on a 
consistent basis. An example of a seasonality is the January 
Effect, where returns are historically above average when 
compared to the other months of the year. Bradfield (1990) 
produced an article about the January Effect on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). Since the Weekend Effect and the January 
Effect are both studies of seasonalities, a brief review of his 
findings is given. 
Bradfield found that the JSE has a significant December Effect 
(in contrast to the more commonly observed January effect). His 
explanation for the December seasonal is based on the volatility 
of shares over this month. In South Africa, December is includes 
a holiday period during which there is very little trading. The 
reduced trading activity results in less volatile share returns. 
Bradfield concludes "that the significant seasonal effect in 
December is more likely to be a result of re la ti vely less 
5Dependencies relate to a repetitive pattern in share 
prices, based on the history of the share price. 
6There has only been one study of the Weekend Effect on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Bhana, 1985), but there have been 
other seasonality studies, such as the January Effect, which is 
explained later in this chapter. In addition there have been 
seasonality studies on other South African markets, for example 












substantial volatility than substantial return in December7 ." 
on the U.S. markets Lakonishok and Smidt (1984) find a strong 
year-end rally when looking at share returns around Christmas and 
New Year's Eve. They conclude that the year-end rally may be in 
anticipation of good results ·due to "window dressing" by 
financial institutions whose financial year ends on 31 December. 
It may be that the December rally, documented by Bradfield, is 
due, in part, to a disproportionate number of companies year-ends 
falling on 31 December. In a study conducted by Lampbrechts 
(1988), he noted that 96% of companies have their year-end in 
either December, February, March, June or September. A large 
number of these companies may be "window dressing"8 for the year-
end. The disproportionately large number of year-ends falling on 
31 December may cause share prices to rise in anticipation of 
good results. 9 
This study is particularly timely, due to the fact that it is 
being conducted just subsequent to Shana's (1993) study of Public 
Holiday share price behaviour on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Consequently, this study's results coincide with Bhana's results 
regarding this holiday effect on the JSE. 
Bhana ( 1993) evaluates the impact of public holidays on the 
returns of companies listed on the JSE from 1975 to 1990. The 
holiday effect has been observed on all the major stock exchanges 
of the world, and is merely one of the many possible 
seasonalities. Bhana states "The holiday effect is intimately 
tied to the Weekend Effect." Once again this leads to the 
question of whether the Weekend Effect and the holiday effect are 
merely part of some more general "closed-market effect." 
An index study by Ariel (1990) on the Dow Jones Industrial from 
1963 to 1982 yielded the following results on the holiday effect: 
- pre-holiday above average returns are not caused by 
outliers (i.e. one or two extreme observations in the data 
set, which would cause the results to be biased.) 
- abnormal pre-holiday returns are not attributable to 
7For more information please refer to (Bradfield, 1990) page 
8. 
8This term is used by Lakonishok and Levi to describe the 
process whereby companies structure their balance sheets and 
income statements prior to the financial year end, so that the 
financial statements will display an orderly and profitable 
company. 
9Another factor to consider is the phycological element. It 
could be that the buoyant and happy mood of the festive season 
carries over to the share market. However, such phycological 
elements are extremely difficult to analyze empirically, and will 












increased risk10 • In fact, the variance of pre-holiday 
returns was less than the variance of non-holiday returns. 
"Indeed, not only is the pre-holiday variance not greater 
than the variance for other days, the pre-holiday variance 
is actually lower than the variance of non-pre-holidays. 
This fact serves to emphasise that the high pre-holiday 
return is not a reward for bearing extra risk" (R. Ariel, 
1990). 
- Holidays not associated with market closings do not 
experience abnormal returns. This again lends support to 
the closed market hypothesis11 , since above average returns 
are a function of the market closing, and not a function of 
the holiday. · 
- Activity by specialists can be ruled out as a major 
causal factor for the high pre-holiday returns. 
Bhana' s study of the holiday effect on the JSE revealed the 
following: 
(i) On average, the pre-holiday return12 equals five times 
the return accruing on non-pre-holidays. 
(ii) By sub-dividing the sixteen year sample period into 
two equal sub-sets, it was ascertained that the holiday 
effect has not varied substantially over time. (The results 
in the first period were similar to the results of the 
second time period.) 
(iii) The high pre-holiday return is not a reward for 
bearing extra risk. In fact it was found that the pre-
holiday variance was less than the variance on the other 
days of the week. 
(iv) The pre-holiday strength13 is only in evidence on the 
10It could be that the returns prior to a holiday are higher 
in order to compensate the investor for assuming a greater degree 
of risk. This was not found to be the cause of the abnormal pre-
holiday returns. 
11This hypothesis assumes that returns before and after a 
public holiday exhibit patterns similar to the Weekend Effect 
(Bhana, 1993). 
12Pre-holiday return is measured in the same manner as 
returns for day of the week effects. Refer to equation {l} in 
Chapter Three. 
13Pre-holiday strength relates to the disproportionate 
frequency of share price increases on trading days preceding 
holidays (Fields, 1934). The increase of the share price on a 
particular day is observed in the above average return on that 
day, since return is a comparison of the current price level 













day immediately before the holiday. ( ie Returns do not 
accrue on the days preceding the holiday. It is only the 
day immediately before the holiday that has abnormally 
large returns. ) 
(v) An investigation of the manner in which the closing 
price was determined, (bid or ask price) indicated that the 
bid-ask effect can be regarded as an important contributor 
to the high pre-holiday returns. (This is discussed further 
in this chapter14 .) 
However, one possible weakness of the above study is the fact 
that over 33% of the pre-holiday days were Fridays. Consequently, 
the study may be documenting a holiday effect, whereas it is 
actually a Weekend Effect. In addition, nearly 20% of the 
holidays (Christmas and New Year) are in the December time 
period, and can be influenced by the December Effect documented 
by Bradfield and discussed above. 
2.3 Intraweek Trading Patterns 
One part of the study of seasonali ties relates to intra week 
trading patterns. These studies concentrate on the pattern of 
returns across the weekdays. The first paper dealing with the 
concept of intraweek trading patterns is that of Fields (1931). 
Fields conducted his study on the Dow Jones daily average of 
industrials over the period 1915 to 1930. At the time, there was 
the perception that share prices would generally decline on a 
Saturday (share markets used to be open on Saturdays in the U.S.) 
due to the unwillingness of security traders to carry their 
positions over until Monday, given the uncertainties over a 
weekend. However, this belief was found to have no foundation in 
fact. Contrary to popular opinion, Fields found that prices 
tended to rise prior to a holiday. He attributed this rise in 
prices to covering short sales prior to a holiday. He also 
expressed the guarded opinion that "commitments are covered more 
completely in anticipation of a holiday in a declining market 
than where the course of prices is upward." The explanation he 
gives is that those who invest on the upside are generally less 
experienced traders than those who undertake short sales._ 
In 1934, Fields carried out a formal test of the hypothesis he 
developed in 1931. He wished to test whether commitments are 
covered more completely in anticipation of an exchange holiday 
14The closing share price will be recorded as either the last 
trade price, bid price or ask price. The bid price is the price 
at which a broker is prepared to buy a share for a client and is 
usually lower than the ask price at which shares are to be sold 
for clients. Keim and Stambaugh (1984) hypothesized that market 
makers transacting at bid (ask) price with disproportionate 
frequency at market close on certain days might induce low (high) 
returns on these days. The high pre-holiday returns might 
likewise be caused by a disproportionate frequency of last 












in a declining market, than when the tendency of prices is 
upward. Should the evidence support this hypothesis, it would 
point clearly to the influence of short selling. The method used 
was to compare the index of the day immediately preceding every 
exchange holiday with the averages of the indexes of the two 
adjacent days. Thus, if the exchange was closed on Wednesday of 
any week, the index averages of Tuesday would be compared with 
the same measures on Monday and Thursday. 
It is interesting to note from his empirical results that 
industrial indices average lower on Monday than on any other 
weekday. (This characteristic is common to almost all studies 
dealing with the Weekend Effect.) What is of particular interest 
is that negative Monday returns present in the bear markets of 
the early part of this century continue to exist in the bull 
markets of the 1980's. Fields took a close look at the 1929 -
1932 period and commented that "despite the severity of the 
decline during this period, the pre-holiday index displayed 
remarkable strength." 
Consequently, Fields concluded that the rise in prices on the day 
prior to an exchange holiday, in a bear market, could be 
attributed to investors covering short commitments. One aspect 
of the data hampered his conclusion - the "tendency of stock 
quotations to strengthen on the pre-holiday is apparently not 
peculiar to years of declining prices [i.e. bear markets J". Field 
ended his paper by noting "it is submitted, however, that fertile 
seeds for a broader investigation of the whole problem are 
contained in this study." He could not have anticipated that 
these seeds would continue to grow 60 years later! 
Fields therefore introduced the concept that share returns may 
not be the same on all days of the week. However, it was not 
until 1973 that the influence of weekends in particular was 
considered. Up to this point, researchers had not considered 
whether there was any dependence in successive daily share price 
changes15 • Cross (1973) was the first to consider that dependence 
might occur on some days of the week, but not others. He 
investigated this h~pothesis by considering the distribution of 
share price changes 6 on Fridays and Mondays, from 1953 to 1970. 
It was found that the Standard & Poors Composite Stock Index 
(hereinafter "S & P Composite") performed better on Fridays than 
on Mondays both in terms of mean percentage change and the 
15Fields had documented a rise in prices on the day before 
a holiday. However, he had not considered whether this had any 
relationship with price movements on other weekdays. Cross (1973) 
was the first to consider that a relationship might exist between 
the movement of the share price on Friday and Monday. Thus this 
was the first paper that considered the influence of the weekend 
on share price movements. 
16The distribution of share price changes was investigated 
by studying the closing values of the standard and Poor' s 












percentage of times the index advanced in the eighteen years 
studied. In addition, it was found that should the index decline 
on a Friday, then the odds were three to one in favour of a 
decline on Monday. The converse did not hold true - there was an 
equal probability of the Monday index advancing or declining 
after an advance in the Friday index. These relationships were 
unique to Friday and Monday, and did not carry over to any other 
days of the week. Thus Cross documented "an example of non-random 
movements in stock prices." This non-random movement in share 
prices appeared to violate the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.4 Calendar Time, Trading Time and Negative Monday Returns 
French (1980) examined the process of share return generation. 
He performed tests to determine whether the distribution of daily 
returns on the S & P Composite supported the calendar time or 
trading time hypotheses. 
2.4.1 Calendar Time Hypothesis 
Fama (1965) was first to test the hypothesis that returns 
are generated in calendar time. He tested this hypothesis 
by comparing the variance of share returns on Monday with 
the variance on other days of the week. The calender time 
hypothesis assumes that asset returns are generated 
continuously during calendar time. Thus returns are 
generated irrespective of whether the market is open 
(trading) or closed (no trading). As a result, the 
distribution of returns for Monday should reflect the two 
day weekend interval where asset returns are generated, but 
the market is closed. Ignoring holidays, the returns 
reported for Monday represent a three-calendar-day 
investment, from the close of trading Friday to the close 
of trading Monday, while the returns for other days reflect 
a one-day investment (French, 1980). Consequently, Monday's 
mean return should be three times as large as the mean 
return for any other day of the week (Junkus, 1986). It 
should be noted that while Fama developed the calendar time 
hypothesis, he tested it by comparing the variance of 
returns across the weekdays; however, it was French (1980) 
who tested the theory by comparing returns across the days 
of the week. Once again the calendar time hypothesis 
assumes that returns are generated randomly over a period 
of time - irrespective of whether the market is open or 
closed. This would be a logical hypothesis, since the 
efficient market hypothesis posits that the share price 
reflects all available information. If it is assumed that 
information is generated continuously, then it should also 
be assumed that share returns are generated in continuous 
time. Thus, Monday's return should represent a three-
calendar-day investment. 
2.4.2 Trading Time Hypothesis 
The trading time hypothesis assumes that returns are 












distribution of asset returns for any particular day of the 
week is expected to be the same as any other day of the 
week, since the market is open for an equal number of hours 
on each weekday. (i.e. Monday's return is equal to Tuesday's 
return, which is equal to Wednesday's return etc. ) No 
returns should be generated on non trading days, such as 
weekends and public holidays (Hess,1981;Junkus,1986). Clark 
(1973) was the first to develop a model in which returns 
are generated in trading time. However, Clark tested this 
.model by simply comparing the variance of returns across 
weekdays, while French (1980) tested the model by comparing 
the returns17 across the weekdays. 
French tested the trading time and calendar time hypotheses18 by 
comparing the returns on indices for different days of the week. 
The daily returns on the s & P Composite from 1953 to 1977 were 
used to examine whether returns are generated in calendar time 
or trading time. The results were surprising. The data was 
inconsistent with both models. Instead it was found that the mean 
returns for Monday were significantly negative, while the returns 
for the other four days of the week were positive (French,1980). 
This finding was not unique. Gibbons and Hess (1981) also found 
negative returns for Monday from 1962 to 1978 on the S & P 500, 
CRSP Value-Weighted and CRSP19 Equal-Weighted portfolios. In 
addition, the negative Monday return is found by cross (1973), 
but he fails to discuss these findings in his conclusion. 
French goes on to examine whether the negative Monday return is 
unique to Monday, or whether it occurs on any day after the 
market is closed. He does this by comparing returns for days 
following holidays with 'non-holiday' returns. The results 
indicate that the "persistently negative returns for Monday are 
caused by some Weekend Effect, rather than by a general closed-
market effect" (French,1980). It is unfortunate that French did 
not go on to examine Friday returns in more detail. It would have 
been useful to determine whether the Friday returns were 
abnormally positive, and if this were the case to determine 
whether this was a function of the market closing or a Weekend 
Effect. This relates back to Field's documentation of a rise in 
share prices on the day preceding a holiday due to covering short 
sales. This would indicate a closed market effect as opposed to 
17French' s study of returns is important since it represented 
a new approach to testing the two hypotheses. In addition, his 
work is important in the context of this study, as this study 
tests whether returns on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange fit the 
calendar or trading time models. 
18French tested these two hypotheses by means of regression 
analysis. The trading and calendar time regression equations are 
detailed and explained in equation { 2} and equation { 3} in 
Chapter Three. The three calendar day investment is adjusted for 
by dividing Monday's return by three. 












a Weekend Effect. However, Board and Sutcliffe (1988) performed 
a similar study on the U.K. market and found no evidence to 
suggest that the negative Monday return was in fact a smaller 
part of some general closed market effect. Ariel (1990) 
researched share index returns on the trading day prior to 
holidays. He found that share index returns on these days were 
on average nine to fourteen times the mean returns for other days 
of the year. He also investigatedw the possibility that this was 
not a simple manifestation of the Weekend Effect, and concluded 
that it was not. However, this conclusion is doubtful considering 
that 68 of the 160 pre-holidays fell on a Friday. It could be 
that the high pre-holiday return is part of the above average 
positive Friday return constituting part of the Weekend Effect. 
French then considered the implications for market efficiency. 
He attributed the negative Monday return to the possibility that 
unfavourable information tended to be released over the weekend. 
However, he did not have any empirical evidence to support this 
hypothesis. He noted that these observations appeared to 
contradict the efficient market hypothesis. A negative return on 
a Monday should not have been in existence for such a long period 
of time. Investors would come to expect the release of 
unfavourable information on the weekends and would thus discount 
share prices appropriately throughout the week. "It is difficult 
to imagine any reasonable model of equilibrium consistent with 
both market efficiency and negative expected returns on a 
portfolio as large as the standard and Poor's composite"21 
(French,1980). 
Bhana (1985) tested the calendar and trading time hypotheses on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). He used the same 
methodology as that employed by French. The data consisted of the 
daily closing value of the All Share Index during the period 1978 
- 1983. 
20Ariel conducted this investigation by performing regression 
analysis. The daily share index returns were regressed against 
dummy variables for the days of the week plus an added pre-
holiday dummy variable. The magnitude of the pre-holiday dummy 
represents the additional return earned on pre-holidays after 
adjusting for differing means across different days of the week. 
(Dummy variables are discussed in Chapter Three along with 
equation {2} and {3}.) 
21French (1980) did not incorporate transaction and 
information costs into his statistical analysis. However, he 
concludes "the persistently negative returns for Monday appear 
to be evidence of market inefficiency. Although an active trading 
strategy based on the negative expected returns would not have 
been profitable because of transaction costs, investors could 
have increased their expected returns by altering the timing of 
trades that would have been made anyway". Despite the uneven 
pattern of returns across weekdays, no researchers have found a 
profitable trading rule, once transaction costs are accounted 












The results were inconsistent with both the calendar and trading 
time hypotheses. The JSE, as with other international markets, 
exhibits a significantly negative Monday return while the average 
return for other days of the week is positive. However it was not 
Friday that exhibited the highest return, but rather Wednesday. 
One of Bhana's recommendations is that follow-up studies should 
be undertaken as more information becomes available. This study 
proposes to do exactly that. The period studied by Bhana was 
short22 in comparison to other international studies. 
Consequently, a study conducted on the JSE, with further data now 
available, serves to confirm or dispute Bhana's results. Should 
Bhana's results be confirmed by this study, it will provide clear 
evidence of the existence of a negative Monday effect on the JSE. 
However, should his results be disputed by the findings of this 
study, then it may call into question the existence of the 
Weekend Effect on the JSE. 
Moreover, it may indicate that the Weekend Effect has disappeared 
or shifted over time. The study may find that the Weekend Effect' 
has "shifted" to other days of the week. This might be explained 
by the behaviour of investors, who (through publications) have 
become aware of the Weekend Effect. Consequently, investors may 
sell shares on a Wednesday and buy on a Monday. These very acts 
would serve to nullify a high Wednesday and low Monday. 
Consequently the study may find a high Monday and low Wednesday 
due to an over reaction of investors! 
In addition, this investigation extends Bhana's analysis in 
several new and important ways: 
(i) The literature review did not discover any study that 
has investigated the different components of the JSE All 
Share Index. Bradfield (1990) pointed out that the JSE is 
unique in comparison to international markets. This is due 
to the influence of gold shares on the All Share Index. In 
addition, several of the international studies were 
performed on their industrial indices. Consequently, it is 
vital to split any study of the All Share Index up into 
both the Industrial and the Gold Indices. This will improve 
the comparison of this study's results to earlier findings. 
It may be that the Gold Index has a unique day of the week 
effect that influences the behaviour of the All Share 
Index. Thus the Industrial Index (which is arguably more 
closely aligned to international share indices) may 
demonstrate a similar negative Monday and high Friday 
· return, but due to the unique influence of the Gold Index 
a situation exists where Wednesday has the highest return. 
22Bhana's empirical study was based on only five years of 
data, whereas other international studies are typically based on 
at least twelve years of data. This study is based on seven and 
a half years of data on the All Share, Industrial and Gold 
Indices. If Bhana's study period is combined with this thesis' 












{ii) The study investigates what influence {if any) the 
introduction of the futures market has had on the equities 
market - in particular the effect it has had on the three 
indices (ALSI, INDI, GLDI) on which there are futures 
contracts. An additional financial instrument that may have 
had an impact on the behaviour of the All Share Index is 
the Equity Linked Fixed Interest (ELFI) security issued by 
Transnet. Returns behaviour of this particular instrument 
is similar to that of a futures contract, since it's 
trading value and redemption value are also linked to the 
level of the All Share Index. Finally, options may also 
have an influence on the level of the indices, but the 
extent of such impact has probably been limited due to the 
negligible trade in equity options. 
(iii) This study investigates possible explanations for the 
existence of the Weekend Effect on the JSE. The study looks 
at the influence of settlement delays by co sidering the 
impact of interest effects. This is made all the more 
interesting by the fact that the settlement period changed 
from fourteen business days to seven business days during 
the period of study (26 February 1986 to 3 March 1993). In 
addition this study considers what effect, if any, 
dividends have on the closing level of the share indices, 
and consequently on the returns on these indices. 
2.s Possible Explanations of the weekend Effect 
Many researchers have documented an empirical anomaly which 
appears to contradict the efficient market hypothesis, trading 
time hypothesis and calendar time hypothesis. Recently the focus 
of research has shifted, attempting to discover a reasonable 
explanation for the negative Monday return. Many possibilities 
have been considered, and are discussed below: 
2.s.1. Infrequently Traded Small Issues 
Gibbons & Hess {1981) confirmed previous findings of the negative 
mean Monday return. They found that from 1962 to 1978 the average 
annual return on Monday ranged from -33. s·% for the S&P 500 to -
26.8% for the equal-weighted index. Since they were unaware of 
any theory that would predict negative Monday returns, they 
considered whether the results could be explained by 
inappropriate statistical assumptions. Small issues tend to trade 
infrequently. Gibbons & Hess state that "if small issues tend to 
trade more frequently on Friday than other days of the week, the 
mean of the observed returns of an index would be high on Friday 
and low on Monday." However, this would still not explain the 
negative Monday return. In addition, the theory assumes that when 
shares are traded frequently, their prices increase. This is not 
a valid assumption, since shares may trade frequently in a 
declining (bear) market as well as in a rising market. To 












tests using only actively traded sharesn. Results indicated that 
the negative Monday return was common to both frequently and 
infrequently traded shares. At the same time it was discovered 
that sample variances did not show a strong Monday effect. 
Bradfield (1990) conducted a study on the estimation problems 
caused by thin trading on the JSE for the period January 1978 to 
August 1987. The study revealed "that the extent of thin trading 
on the JSE is indeed significant ••••• consequently, the 
estimation procedures using recorded security prices are likely 
to be significantly affected by the thin trading phenomenon on 
the JSE." The main cause of the problems associated with thin 
trading is the fact that recorded prices are used to represent 
true underlying prices. This may not be the case, since the 
recorded price represents the last price at which a trade takes 
place. On a thinly traded market, such as the JSE, the recorded 
price may be several weeks old. Thus the last recorded price may 
not represent the current underlying price. This would cause 
problems for any empirical study, since any "statistical 
inferences made on this basis would be distorted." 
This study needs to consider the impact, if any, caused by thin 
trading. Bradfield suggests that where the proposed beta 
estimator is needed, a statistical manipulation of the data 
should occur~. In this study the beta estimator is not required, 
and thus it is not necessary to perform this statistical 
manipulation. More importantly, one of the requirements for the 
inclusion of a share in an index~, is that it must be frequently 
traded. By definition, all shares forming the indices are 
frequently traded and thus the recorded prices closely represent 
the underlying prices. Consequently, it is considered that the 
components of the indices do not suffer from a lack of trade, and 
thus the indices themselves do not suffer from the problems 
associated with thin trading. 
2.s.2.) Heteroscedasticity 
Gibbons & Hess (1981) considered the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. (It is assumed that the covariance matrix is 
the same for all days of the week. This assumption may not be 
valid. To avoid heteroscedasticity the regression equation is 
standardized by the estimated standard deviations for each day 
of the week. The statistical concepts are explained in more 
nTo overcome the nontrading problem, as well as to determine 
the extent of the Monday phenomenon across shares, Gibbons and 
Hess performed the tests on firms included in the Dow Jones 30. 
All of these shares are actively traded. 
~The exact manipulation is not documented in this paper, but 
can be found in - Cohen et al. (1983) Journal of Financial 
Economics, 12, pgs 263 - 278. 












detail at a later stage.) "The heteroscedasticity adjustment had 
no important impact on the conclusions" (Gibbons & Hess,1981). 
Since Gibbons and Hess found that the heteroscedasticity 
adjustment had no major influence on the results of their study, 
it is not considered necessary to make any adjustments to the 
data in this study. 
2.5.3.) Institutional Features 
Researchers have also considered the impact of institutional 
featuresu. The share market exhibits a strong negative Monday 
return, but is this unique to the share market i.e. are day of 
the week effects caused by institutional features unique to share 
markets? The hypothesis was tested by considering whether the 
same results were found in the U.S. Treasury Bills market. 
Resul ts27 indicated that treasury bills exhibit stro g day of the 
week effects, which are qualitatively the same as the share 
market. Yadev and Pope (1991) also found intraweek and intraday 
trading patterns on the London International Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE). The futures contracts used in their study were based on 
the FTSElOO index for the period April 28, 1986 to March 23, 
1990. 
studies on the South African Post Office Bonds, Eskom 168 and RSA 
bonds by Hattingh & Smit (1992) indicate that the seasonal 
pattern in daily price movements is not restricted to the JSE. 
Six types of seasonal patterns are observed: day-of-the-week 
effect, week-of-the-month effect, turn-of-the-month effect, 
January effect, January vs other non-turn-of-the-month effects 
and turn-of-the-year vs turn-of-the-month effects. Bhana (1985) 
extended his study of the indices to the Treasury Bills Market 
to determine whether the Weekend Effect is unique to the equities 
market. His results indicate that there is a similar pattern for 
the returns of Treasury Bills, and thus "it would seem that the 
weekend phenomenon is widespread across other types of financial 
assets." 
It appears as if the day of the week effect in South Africa is 
not unique to the share market. This observation corresponds with 
international findings. It will be interesting to perform studies 
on futures prices and option prices to determine if they also 
26These institutional features include, for example, the 
manner in which trade occurs (screen traded or open outcry) , 
transaction costs, liquidity levels, etc. 
vGibbons & Hess (1981) find a negative Monday return for USA 
treasury bills. Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) document from 
1977 to 1984, a negative Monday seasonal in a variety of U.S. 
Treasury bills. Significant day of the week effects are also 
documented in the federal funds market by Cornell (1983) and 
Eisemann and Timme (1984) and in markets for foreign exchange by 












exhibit day of the week effects. These topics could form the 
basis for future research. 
2.5.4.) Measurement Error 
Gibbons & Hess (1981) also considered the possibility of 
measurement error~. All empirical research assumes that security 
prices are observed without measurement error, although this may 
not be true in practice. One possible error that can arise with 
infrequently traded shares, is that the share price is out of 
date. Friday's return had shown a tendency for above-normal 
returns. Consequently, they investigated the possibility that 
Monday's negative returns are explained by Friday's above-normal 
return. This is because Monday's return is calculated by dividing 
the difference between Monday's closing index value and Friday's 
closing index value, by Friday's closing index value29 • Should 
Friday's closing index value be abnormally large, then it would 
cause Monday to have a negative return. One would expect the 
average combined return for Friday and Monday to not be 
significantly different from the average return for other days 
of the week. Gibbons and Hess therefore tested whether there was 
a measurement error by adjusting Friday and Monday's return with 
Wednesday's mean return. The results indicate that measurement 
errors do not provide an adequate explanation of the Monday 
phenomenon. However, this test assumes that Wednesday's mean 
return is not significantly different from other day's means. 
This statistical assumption was re-addressed by Keim and 
Stambaugh (1984) whose findings are discussed below. 
Consequently, tests based on offsetting Friday and Monday mean 
returns fail to support the hypothesis of measurement error. 
Keim and Stambaugh considered an alternative test for the 
presence of measurement error. They looked at the possibility 
that Friday's return is subject to 'random errors' that are, on 
average, positive, while Monday's return is subject to random 
errors that are, on average, negative. This implies that 11 if 
measurement error plays an important role around the weekend, 
then the correlation between Friday's return and Monday's return 
will tend to be lower (perhaps negative) than between other 
successive days. 11 The results showed that the average correlation 
between Friday's return and Monday's return is the highest of all 
the days. This is opposite to what a measurement error 
28Measurement error is based on the assumption that there may 
be systematic errors in the data across weekdays. Gibbons and 
Hess (1981) do not try to give an explanation for the systematic 
errors, but are content to test the hypothesis that the negative 
Monday return is the result of an above average Friday return. 
~For the formulae, refer to equation {l} in Chapter Three. 
However, if Friday's closing index value is always above average, 
then Monday's closing index value would on average be lower than 
Friday's closing index value. This would cause Monday's return 
to be negative, since the numerator in the equation is Monday's 












explanation would predict. These findings were consistent with 
cross' evidence which suggested that correlations between Friday 
and Monday returns are the highest of any pair of successive 
days. In addition, Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) provided 
international evidence that measurement errors do not explain the 
Weekend Effect by studying daily share index returns on the u. s. , 
U .K., Canadian, Japanese, and Australian30 share markets. Harris 
(1986) considered three new tests of the high Friday closing 
price, and came to the conclusion that "It is unlikely that the 
Weekend Effect ......... is the result of manipulated Friday 
closing prices." 
Board and Sutcliffe ( 1988) considered the measurement error 
hypothesis for the u .K. share market, by using daily closing 
values of the Financial Times All Share Index from 1962 to 1986. 
They investigate the possibility that negative returns on Monday 
are caused by an upward bias in Friday's closing price or a 
downward bias in Monday's closing price.· This would lead to a 
high Friday return and a low Monday return, i.e. the Weekend 
Effect. However, the overall return from Thursday close to Monday 
close would be unaffected. After testing this proposal, they 
confirm that systematic measurement errors are not the cause of 
the Weekend Effect. 
The numerous studies involving measurement error conducted on 
almost all the international markets have failed to produce any 
significant explanation of the Weekend Effect. For this reason 
it is considered appropriate to ignore the possible effects of 
measurement error in this study. 
2.5.5.) Interest Effects of settlement Delays 
Up to this point the settlement delays in transactions have not 
been considered. Th  research has assumed that share 
purchases/sales result in instantaneous payment. Clearly this is 
not the case, as payment normally occurs several business days 
after the actual transaction date. The interest effects of 
settlement delays need to be considered. This means that the spot 
price is really a forward price - spot price grossed up by the 
riskless rate of interest for the period of the settlement 
delay31 • In the U.S. share markets prior to February 10, 1968, 
30Indices used were: Japan - Nikkei Dow from 1970 to 1983, 
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange Index from 1976 to 1983, 
Australia - Statex Actuaries Index from 1973 to 1982, U.K. -
Financial Times Ordinary Share Index from 1950 to 1983, U.S. -
s & P Composite from 1962 to 1983. 
31The interest effects of settlement delays are factored into 
the price that is quoted, as payment does not occur 
instantaneously. Thus, the spot price is really a forward price 
which is equal to the equivalent of an instantaneous cash 
settlement amount plus an interest amount. The interest amount 












the settlement period was four business days. Subsequently it 
changed to five business days. Any settlement period that is not 
a simple multiple of five business days creates a possible day 
of the week effect. With a four business day settlement period, 
Monday's spot price should be grossed up by four days of 
interest, whereas Tuesday's through Friday's spot price should 
be grossed up by six days - four business days and two weekend 
days. This asymmetry in settlement periods could cause Monday's 
return to be lower than the rest of the week. After February 10, 
1968, no day of the week effect should be observed, since the 
settlement period was just five business days. 
Since daily interest data is not easily available, Gibbons & Hess 
(1981) used an alternative technique. "If the negative effect on 
Monday is due to settlement periods, stock returns should be high 
enough on Tuesday to compensate for Monday's falloff. By testing 
for this effect, the linkage between the day of the week anomaly 
and settlement procedures can be examined." The results indicate 
that settlement procedures do not explain day of the week 
effects. This result should have been expected since the negative 
Monday return was still in existence after February 10, 1968, 
when the settlement period was 5 business days. Gibbons & Hess 
then make an interesting comment. Instead of concluding that 
weekly seasonalities contradict the efficient market hypothesis, 
they conclude that equal expected returns for all weekdays is 
merely a convenient statistical assumption. "From a scientific 
point of view, it is more useful to conclude that the results are 
strong evidence that equilibrium returns vary across days of the 
week." Consequently any other studies trying to evaluate market 
efficiency must take day of the week effects into account. 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) confirm that day of the week effects 
do not contradict the efficient market hypothesis but that they 
"could potentially influence conclusions about, for example, 
market efficiency." It should be noted that only if one could 
consistently earn excess returns by forming a trading rule based 
on day of the week effects, would such a trading rule contradict 
the efficient market hypothesis. One such trading rule would be 
to purchase the index on Monday, and sell on Friday. However, 
even if day of the week effects do not contradict the efficient 
market hypothesis, they still represent an interesting anomaly 
that has yet to be fully explained. In addition, researchers 
often make the plausible assumption that returns are even across 
all weekdays. As has been documented, this assumption is at odds 
with economic reality. 
Lakonishok and Levi (hereafter L & L,1982) modified Gibbons and 
Hess' study relating to settlement effects using the closing 
value of the CRSP equal- and value-weighted indices between July 
1962 and December 1979. L & L's argument was based on the delay 
between trading and settlement in shares and in clearing cheques. 
After February 10, 1968, the clearing delay means that in weeks 
without a holiday, shares purchased on business days other than 
Friday give the buyer eight calender days before losing funds for 












share purchases. These eight days are the five business days for 
settlement, the two weekend days, and the cheque clearing day. 
Shares purchased on a Friday result in payment occurring ten 
calender days later. These ten days are made up of five business 
settlement days, four weekend days and one day for cheque 
clearing. Buyers should therefore be prepared to pay more for 
shares purchased on a Friday by the amount of two days of 
interest. This means that equilibrium expected returns on Friday 
will be higher than any other day of the week by an amount of two 
days of interest. 
Prior to February 10, 1968, the settlement period was four 
business days, and one day for cheque clearing. L & L did not 
therefore expect a day of the week effect to be present prior to 
1968. Without carrying the study any further, they should have 
realised that the hypothesis could not have worked, since all 
previous studies had documented a negative Monday return before 
to 1968. Dyl & Martin, 1985, criticise this very point. L & L 
{1985) reply that the settlement period prior to 1968 was , in 
practice, longer than the four day official settlement period. 
It was due to the inability of investors to settle transactions 
in four business days that lead to the introduction of the five 
day settlement period. L & L then considered the impact that 
holidays have on these settlement periods. It is sufficient to 
note that, due to interest rate effects, holidays affect 
equilibrium expected returns in a complex fashion. 
Consequently, L & L considered unadjusted returns from 1962 to 
1967 and returns adjusted for interest effects from 1968 to 1974. 
The results indicated that the extra return on Fridays, after the 
adjustment, was extremely small. However, the adjusted returns 
still did not fully eliminate the excess Friday return or the 
negative Monday return. L & L concluded that settlement 
procedures and cheque clearing delays provide only a partial 
explanation of the Weekend Effect. Their results showed that the 
settlement effect accounts for only 20% of the Weekend Effect. 
They also noted that it appeared as if the negative Monday effect 
had disappeared during the period 1974 to 1979. However, Dyl and 
Martin {1985) note that the negative Monday return re-appears in 
1980 to 1981 and that "perhaps L & L have overstated the case for 
the demise of the Weekend Effect." Theobald and Price (1984) 
conduct a similar study on the U.K. equities market, which is 
discussed below. 
Jaffe and Westerfield {1985) conducted a study of settlement 
procedures on equity markets in Canada, U.K., Japan, and 
Australia. They concluded that settlement procedures in the U.K., 
Japan, and Canada do not explain the weekly seasonal at all. In 
fact, their results show that seasonal patterns increase after 
an adjustment for settlement costs in each country. In Australia, 
settlement procedures may account for part of the high returns 
on Thursday and Friday, although probably not for the low returns 
on Monday and Tuesday. This conclusion seems harsh, particularly 
in light of L & L's study regarding the U.S. market. There is 
little doubt that, in theory, adjustments should be made for 












open to debate. It seems extremely unlikely that investors attach 
no time value to money, or that the adjustment is trivial in 
comparison to normal daily returns. It would seem that an 
adjustment for settlement is necessary in any empirical study. 
Although the adjustment is not sufficient to fully explain the 
magnitude of the Weekend Effect, the required interest adjustment 
has a magnitude of some relevance. 
Solnik and Bousquet (1990} considered the impact of settlement 
effects on the Paris Bourse32 • In France, the settlement of all 
transactions takes place once a month on a fixed date. This 
settlement procedure is likely to affect the distribution of 
daily share returns. The magnitude of the effect ought to be up 
to one month of interest. Thus the French market provides a good 
opportunity to test the importance of settlement procedures, 
since the interest effect should be large in comparison to the 
other markets that had been tested. It was found that the mean 
return on the first day of a new 'account' was more than ten 
times the mean return for other days of the week. This extra 
return converted into approximately one month of financing cost, 
at the short term interest rate. Consequently, the theoretical 
prediction, in regard to settlement effects, appeared to be 
correct. However, it was found that all days of the week 
displayed a positive return, except Tuesday. This was not totally 
unique, since a negative Tuesday return had also been documented 
in Australia, Japan and Singapore. However, it was the first time 
that a negative Tuesday return had been documented in Europe. 
Later, Solnik (1990} updated the study of the Paris Bourse to 
take account of more recent data and to adjust for dividends. The 
conclusion did not change, as the monthly settlement period still 
did not explain the day of the week effect observed on the Paris 
Bourse. 
Yadev and Pope (1991} studied the U.K. equity market33 and found 
that prices rose betwe n 3p.m. and 5p.m. on Friday afternoons. 
This was due to interest effects - the end of an account is 
actually at 3.30p.m. on the last Friday of an account. However, 
the magnitude of the average price change was found to be much 
smaller than the average value of the interest that should have 
been reflected in cash prices. Hence, consistent with the results 
of Solnik (1990) and Solnik and Bosquet (1990) for the Paris 
Bourse, the market does not appear to efficiently incorporate 
into prices the entire effect of interest costs inherent in its 
settlement procedures. 
It is clear that the interest effect on settlement delays is an 
32Solnik and Bousquet conducted their tests on the CAC index 
from 1978 to 1987. The index is a market-capitalisation-weighted 
index of all the major listed French companies. 
33The research was based on the Financial Times Index for the 
period 28/4/1986 to 23/3/1990. The Financial Times Index is an 
arithmetic average, market value weighted index of the one 












important contributor to any seasonality study. For this reason, 
the settlement delays associated with trades on the JSE must be 
taken into account. The settlement period on the JSE was fourteen 
business days prior to 30 May 1991, but was changed to seven 
business days. When the settlement period was fourteen days, it 
would have resulted in any Wednesday, Thursday or Friday 
purchases having two extra days in which to pay. Thus the index 
levels for these three days should be adjusted downwards by the 
equivalent of two days of interest. When the settlement period 
was changed to seven business days, it caused only a Friday 
purchase to result in an extra two days in which to pay. Thus 
after 30 May 1991, only the Friday index level should be adjusted 
downwards by two days of interest. Clearly public holidays have 
a complex effect on the settlement delays, and need to be taken 
into account. The settlement delays unique to the JSE are 
discussed in more depth in Chapters Three and Four. 
2.5.6.) Timing of corporate Earnings and Dividend Announcements 
Wolfson and Patell (1982) considered the impact of the timing of 
corporate earnings and dividend announcements. More specifically, 
they investigated the possibility that good news is consistently 
released during trading hours while bad news is delayed until the 
market is closed. The classification of good and bad news is 
clearly a relative concept that is relative to market 
expectations. The exact classification o! good and bad news is 
an extremely difficult task. Wolfson ·and Patell classified 
earnings and dividend announcements as good or bad based on two 
criteria: 
( i) Using an expectation model (based on the preceding 
years data) the announcement is classified as good or bad. 
(ii) An endogenous model where share price movements 
following the announcement provide an indication of whether 
the news was good or bad.(Price increases signalling good 
news and price declines indicating bad news.) A weakness of 
this model is that it assumes the observed price change is 
due solely to the dividend or earnings announcement. 
The results indicate that price changes are more likely to be 
positive for announcements made during trading time. There is a 
marked shift toward negative price changes for after-trading 
announcements. This indicates that bad news tends to be delayed 
until the market is closed. Abelson attributes the delay "to an 
old corporate trick: when the news is bad put it out on Friday 
night - and hope it gets lost by Monday morning. " It appears that 
Abelson ignores the efficient market hypothesis. Under the 
efficient market hypothesis it is not possible to fool the market 
by simply hoping that the news will get "lost". Other possible 
reasons for bad news to be delayed until the market is closed 
must be considered. One plausible explanation is that firms want 
bad news to be properly digested before investors react to such 
new information. Directors may fear that if such bad news is not 












harms the firm's reputation. In any event such an hypothesis does 
not go a long way to explaining the Weekend Effect. In an 
efficient market investors come to expect the release of 
unfavourable news on the weekend, and share prices are discounted 
through the rest of the week. 
The impact of the timing of company announcements is difficult 
to quantify and classify. Since this possible explanation is 
relatively subjective, and the fact that rational investors 
would discount the possibility of "after-hours bad news", it is 
not dealt with in this study of the JSE. 
2.5.7.) Thin Trading and Price adiustment Delays 
Theobald and Price (1984) formally analyse the impact of 
nontrading/ thin trading and price-adjustment delays using U.K. 
share index data from 1975 to 1981. Thin trading and price-
adjustment delays cause the "observed" price to differ from the 
"true" price and thus the "observed" return distribution to 
differ from the "true" return distribution. This causes a number 
of statistical problems - nontrading impacts upon the measured 
means, variances and autocovariances of the return distributions. 
Clearly these factors influence any intraweek seasonality 
study34 • 
Theobald and Price illustrated the impact of thin trading by 
using two U.K. indexes - the Financial Times Ordinary (FTO) and 
the Financial Times All Share (FTAS) Indexes. The FTO consists 
of the leading thirty U.K. equity shares, while the FTAS is made 
up of about seven hundred and fifty shares. Since the FTAS is a 
broader-based index, it contains less frequently traded shares 
and is thus more affected by non trading due to its broader 
composition. An analysis of the two indices provides considerable 
evidence of non-normality in the underlying returns as well as 
a negative Monday return. In addition "the measured seasonality 
in the mean was generally stronger in the case of FTO which is 
consistent with the impact of nontrading." (Theobald and Price, 
1984) 
The lack of tradeability on the JSE has already been discussed. 
In theory one might construct an index of the leading thirty JSE 
shares, and compare the results to those obtained for the All 
Share, Industrial and Gold Index. However, this is extremely 
difficult to do, as no such index currently exists. This exercise 
cannot be performed due to practical constraints. However, the 
index constituents have to meet various criteria set by the JSE 
Actuaries Department. One of these criteria is tradeability. For 
the purposes of this study it is sufficient to document the 
problems caused by the lack of tradeability, but to note that 
these problems are mitigated by the selection procedures for the 
index constituents. 
34For a more complete discussion refer to Theobald and Price, 












2.s.a.> Dividend Effects 
Theobald and Price also investigate the impact of dividends on 
the Weekend Effect. Should shares typically go ex-dividend on 
Mondays, then one would expect the share price to drop by the 
present value of their dividends on that Monday. This is because 
the dividend is factored into share price, and thus when the 
share trades ex-dividend the share price drops by the amount of 
the dividend. They investigate this possibility by partitioning 
Mondays into ex-dividend days and non-ex-dividend days. The 
results were a surprise. The non-ex-dividend Mondays showed a 
more strongly negative return than the ex-dividend Mondays. This 
was totally inconsistent with the researchers' expectations. 
However, the answer is found in the unique settlement procedures 
of the U.K. market. Once one takes interest rate effects into 
account, the anomaly is explained. The U.K. stock exchange has 
accounts which usually open on a Monday and are two (sometimes 
three) weeks long. Payment for shares bought is due on the second 
Monday after the end of an account. Shares bought on the first 
Monday of an account will only be settled three weeks (twenty one 
days) after transaction date. These three weeks are made up of 
the two weeks of the account period, and the one week to the 
second Monday after the end of the account period. Thus, the 
first Monday of an account incorporates a twenty one day interest 
gross-up adjustment. one would expect the first Monday of an 
account to exhibit an above average return, due to the interest 
effect. The positive effect is tempered by the fact that the 
first Monday is generally the ex-dividend date. Thus the apparent 
anomaly of positive share returns on ex-dividend Mondays is 
explained by taking interest rate effects into account. In this 
manner, Theobald and Price, confirm the results of Gibbons and 
Hess (1981) and L & L (1982). In so doing, they provide a 
plausible reason for differing Monday effects between the U.K. 
market and the U.S. market. They also highlight that the Weekend 
Effect is of a somewhat more complex nature than that in the 
u.s35 • This is almost certainly due to the more complex 
settlement procedures employed in the U.K. 
Board and Sutcliffe (1988) also considered settlement and 
dividend effects in the UK market by studying the closing values 
of the FTAS Index between 1962 and 1986. They highlight that 
shares go ex-dividend on the first Monday of an account. However, 
they sub-divide Mondays into "First Mondays" of an account, and 
"Other Mondays". The results are enlightening. "First Mondays" 
have a positive return and "Other Mondays" have a negative 
return. The "First Monday" positive return is due to the positive 
settlement effect outweighing the negative ex-dividend effect. 
Consequently, the negative Monday anomaly is still present, but 
in a somewhat more complex manner. Board and Sutcliffe suggested 
that previous studies indicating the demise of the negative 
Monday effect were incorrect. In reality the positive "First 
Mondays" were now outweighing the negative "Other Mondays", 












creating the impression that the negative Monday effect had died 
out. These U.K. results were confirmed by Yadev and Pope (1991). 
Phillips-Patrick and Schneeweis (1988) investigate the impact of 
dividends on U.S. shares, by comparing the daily return on the 
CRSP index which includes dividends and the daily return on the 
CRSP index which excludes dividends. They find that the mean 
dividend yield on Monday is statistically different from each of 
the other four days of the week. Tests prove that the divided 
yield accounts for a portion of the Weekend Effect, but does not 
provide the full explanation. Solnik (1990) studies the impact 
of dividends on the Paris Bourse, and concludes that dividends 
do influence the Weekend Effect, but not enough to fully explain 
the intraweek trading anomaly. 
Lampbrechts (1988) recognises the seasonality of dividends on the 
JSE. He notes that 96% of companies have their year-end in either 
December, February, March, June or September. He comments that 
"a fluctuating dividend payout pattern may therefore 
significantly impact on theoretical prices." For the purposes of 
this study it is important to distinguish if dividends are paid 
on any particular day of the week. What is important is the last 
day to register (LDR), since it is only shareholders who are 
registered on this day that receive the dividend. Thus if a 
particular day of the week has a disproportionately high number 
of LDR's, then the following day would see the shares go ex-
dividend. This would cause a drop in the share price. If it is 
found that shares typically have their LDR falling on a Friday, 
it would serve to explain the negative Monday share returns. This 
paper is unaware of any local study that has evaluated the LOR 
on a daily basis. Previous studies have only evaluated the LDR 
on a weekly basis. Unfortunately these studies are of no use in 
this research. This study needs to determine if the LDR tends to 
fall disproportionately on a particular weekday. If it does, then 
modification of the daily returns is needed so as to adjust for 
any impact of the LOR. It is interesting to note Levett's (1991) 
study of share index futures which observes that "nearly all 
company's LDR dates fall on a Friday." This study needs to adopt 
a sounder statistical approach. This may involve ascertaining 
when the top ten or twenty companies of a particular index 
regularly have their LDR. In this manner we will be able to 
conclude that at least X% of the index_ have their LDR on a 
particular day. 
2.5.9.) Specialist-Related Biases 
Keim and Stambaugh (1984) confirmed the existence of a Weekend 
Effect in their study which used a fifty five year period. The 
study was performed on the s & P Composite from 1928 to 1982. It 
is interesting to note that the returns for 'one-day' weekends 
are consistently negative and not statistically different from 
the 'two-day' weekend returns. (A 'one-day' weekend existed when 
the exchange was open on a Saturday from 10.00a.m. and 12a.m.) 
Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) documented similar findings in the 
Japanese market, which is open on Saturdays. These results 












the week, whether that day is a Friday or Saturday. The 
researchers also considered whether the Weekend Effect is found 
for firms of different sizes (i.e. market capitalisations). The 
results indicate that day of the week effects are evident for 
both large and small firms, but the smaller the firm, the greater 
the tendency for average returns to be high on Friday. 
Keim and Stambaugh then posited a new explanation for the Weekend 
Effect arising from specialist-related biases. Returns on the 
share market are computed from closing prices, where the closing 
price is the price at which the last transaction occurs. On stock 
exchanges, this transaction often involves the specialist, and 
thus the closing price is essentially a bid or ask price, as 
opposed to the true36 market price. Should there be differences 
in the frequency of bid and ask prices, or should bid/ask prices 
prevail on a particular weekday, it could lead to a weekly 
seasonal in share returns37 • "In order to investigate the above 
conjecture, we examine returns computed with bid and ask 
quotations of shares quoted over the counter (OTC market). The 
use of bid-to-bid (or ask-to-ask) returns allows a direct test 
of whether day of the week effects are due to the bid-ask bias" 
(Keim & Stambaugh, 1984). Their evidence indicates that the day 
of the week effect is not due to systematic differences between 
true prices and closing prices recorded on the exchanges. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that the presence of the specialist accounts 
for day of the week effects. Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) 
repeated Keim and Stambaugh' s tests on share market index returns 
for U.K., Japan, Canada, and Australia. Their results were 
consistent with Keim and Stambaugh, as they found no support for 
the specialist-related bias. 
Bhana (1993) conducted a "rough" test on the JSE, to determine 
the extent of the bid-ask bias. He collected the bid, ask and 
closing prices for thirty randomly selected shares on twenty 
seven different days. Bhana' s results contradicted Keim and 
Stambaugh's results. Bhana concluded that "the bid-ask effect can 
be regarded as an important contributor to the high pre-holiday 
returns." It should be noted that the effects of the bid-ask bias 
may not be significant in the case of index constituents, since 
they are defined to be highly tradeable shares, and thus the bid-
ask spread is likely to be insignificant for shares making up the 
indices38 • None the less, the impact of the bid-ask bias is 
36Theobald and Price ( 1984) define the "true" market price 
as being those prices that would arise in the absence of 
frictions in the trading process. 
37Given the nature of the results, the high Friday returns 
would indicate a greater proportion of ask prices, while the 
negative Monday return would indicate a greater proportion of bid 
prices. 
38Bhana randomly selected thirty shares for his test to 
determine the extent of the bid-ask bias. The shares selected in 












investigated in this study. The method in which it will be 
evaluated is discussed in Chapter Three. 
2.6 Returns - Trading Time or Non Trading Time? 
Rogalski (1984) extended day of the week studies further by 
distinguishing between trading and non-trading day returns. Most 
previous research had defined returns as being a comparison of 
the closing level of the previous day's index to the close of the 
current day's index. Over a weekend this would imply that the 
return is the closing level of the index on Monday divided by the 
closing level of the index on Friday. Such a technique fails to 
distinguish when the returns actually accrue - over the non-
trading weekend or during trade on Monday? Rogalski investigated 
whether returns accrue during trading time or non trading time 
by considering closing and opening prices. In this manner he 
could ascertain when the negative Monday returns arise. His 
results indicated that all of the negative average return for the 
S&P 500 occurred during the non-trading period from the Friday 
close to the Monday open. "Thus, the Monday effect discovered by 
French ••.••••.• may actually be a Weekend Effect." (Rogalski, 1984) 
Rogalski then re-considered the trading time hypothesis - this 
time defining returns as being the open to closing level of the 
index on any one day. This is a more correct test of the trading 
time model, since it only looks at returns that are generated 
during actual trading hours. The results were consistent with the 
predictions of the trading time model. Each day of the week had 
equal trading time returns. " French may have incorrectly 
rejected the trading time model because he used close to close 
returns instead of close to previous open returns to represent 
trading day returns." (Rogalski, 1984) Rogalski reperformed the 
analysis using close to close returns and also ended up rejecting 
the trading time model. It would appear that any test of the 
trading time hypothesis should be based strictly on trading time 
returns. 
Harris (1986) replicated Rogalski's tests using the share prices 
of all shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE) from 
1981 to 1983. The results were somewhat different. Only half of 
the negative Monday close-to-close return accrued between Friday 
close and Monday open. The rest of the negative Monday effect 
accrued during the Monday trading period. The contradictory 
results were due to the differing composition of the indices. 
Harris discovered that for large firms, negative Monday close-to-
close returns accrue before the market opens, (ie during the non-
trading weekend period) while for smaller firms most of the 
negative Monday return accrues during trade on Monday. The S & 
selected shares did not form part of the indices, then his 
results are of little relevance to this study, because this study 
is concerned with index constituents only. Shares making up the 
index have to meet the criteria of being highly tradeable, and 












P 500 is mostly made up of large39 shares, while the NYSE index 
is composed of large and small shares. This would go to explain 
why Rogalski documented the negative Monday return accruing over 
the non-trading period, while Harris noticed that it accrued 
partly over the weekend and partly over the Monday trading period 
for the NYSE index. 
Yadev and Pope (1991) considered when returns accrued on the 
London Stock Exchange. They found that the returns accrued during 
the trading period on Monday. However, in contrast to Harris, 
there was no systematic negative price change over the weekend. 
In fact, a significant proportion of the Friday close to Monday 
open price changes were actually positive. This would indicate 
no Weekend Effect, but rather a Monday trading period effect. 
Clearly it is of interest to determine exactly when the returns 
on the markets arise. This study has never been performed on the 
JSE. Unfortunately such an analysis is not be possible, since 
only the closing value of the index is available. Consequently 
one cannot distinguish as to when the returns arise, and thus one 
cannot conclude whether it is a "Weekend" or "Negative Monday" 
phenomenon, if indeed such a phenomenon exists on the JSE. 
2.7 Is it an International Anomaly? 
Jaffe and Westerfield (J & W,1985) realised that most of the 
research regarding the Weekend Effect had been done using U.S. 
and U.K. share returns which documented similar results. J & W 
decided to investigate the possibility that the Weekend Effect 
is in fact some sort of international anomaly. Thus, they 
examined share returns in the U.K., Japan, Canada, and Australia. 
When these markets are combined with the U.S. market, they make 
up 87% of the world's market value of exchange-listed securities. 
All these markets are open from Monday to Friday except Japan, 
which is also open on Saturdays. The results indicate that the 
Weekend Effect is in fact an international anomaly. In each case 
the last trading day of the week showed the highest mean return, 
i.e. Saturday for Japan and Friday for all other countries. This 
evidence is consistent with that of Keim and Stambaugh, who found 
positive share returns, in the U.S. on Saturdays prior to 1968. 
In all countries, a negative Monday return was documented - but 
in the case of Japan and Australia the lowest mean return 
occurred on Tuesday. This phenomenon is confusing since it was 
not found in past studies regarding the U.S. and U.K., and was 
not found in Canada. 
One possible explanation is the time zone differences between 
these markets. The Tokyo Exchange is fourteen hours ahead of the 
New York Exchange and the Sydney Exchange is fifteen hours ahead. 
London is only five hours ahead of New York while Canada is only 
one hour behind. This means that the U.S. trading is never 
concurrent with the Australian and Japanese markets. Because of 
these differences, the daily trading patterns in Australia and 












Japan could be identical to, but one day ahead of, the trading 
patterns in the U.S. This hypothesis seems quite plausible when 
you consider that Australia and Japan have the most negative 
return on Tuesday, and not on Monday as documented for the other 
countries. However J & W "conclude that foreign investors 
confront a week end effect in their respective share markets 
independent of the week end effect in the U.S." {J & W,1985) Thus 
the negative 'Tuesday' return in Australia and Japan seems to 
complicate the weekend anomaly even further. However, J & Wadded 
to existing knowledge by proving that the Weekend Effect is not 
unique to the American and European share markets. 
J & W then considered whether the seasonal pattern in f oreiqn 
exchanqe rates offsets the Weekend Effect in shares for Americans 
investing overseas. McFarland,Pettit and Sung {1982) found that 
returns on foreign currencies to a U.S. investor are generally 
high on Mondays and Wednesdays and low on Thursdays and Fridays. 
It would seem that the high returns on the foreign currency 
market tend to off set the low domestic returns on the 
international share markets, and vice versa. Thus an integration 
of foreign currency markets with U.S. share markets may help 
explain the day of the week effects. It would not, however, prove 
which was the cause of day of the week effects. Unfortunately, 
the tests40 conducted by J & W caused them to conclude that the 
seasonals found in foreign exchange markets do not off set the 
seasonal in foreign share markets. 
A Weekend Effect has already been documented on the JSE by Bhana 
{1985). Further studies on the JSE have been documented in this 
chapter. From these studies it can be determined that the JSE 
does not differ from other international markets - it also has 
a seasonal pattern in share index returns, which has yet to be 
adequately explained. 
2.e Recent Developments - Intraday returns 
Harris {1986) exte ded earlier day of the week studies further 
by considering intraday price patterns on individual shares 
listed on the NYSE. Intraday share price studies are an 
investigation of price movements within the trading day. He 
noticed that there are weekday differences in the pattern of 
intraday returns within the first 45 minutes of trade. Mean 
returns were far higher in magnitude during the opening and 
closing periods. Yadev and Pope {1991) found a similar pattern 
in the U.K. share markets. In the middle of the trading day, no 
such weekday differences were apparent. It appears that even 
within daily trading periods, prices do not accrue at equal 
40The tests were complex due to J & W having to adjust for 
differing settlement delays in the foreign exchange markets and 
the share markets. J & W considered the problem from an American 
viewpoint - that is as an American investing in foreign share 
markets, and the foreign exchange seasonal and share market 












rates. This tends to contradict the trading time hypothesis41 • 
Harris did consider whether these seasonalities contradicted the 
efficient market hypothesis, and came to the conclusion that they 
didn't. This was because as soon as trading costs are taken into 
account, a profitable trading strategy is not possible42 • 
Yadev and Pope (1991), presented a paper to the European Finance 
Association dealing with intraweek and intraday seasonalities in 
share market risk premia. Their paper contributed to the study 
of seasonalities in several new directions. All previous studies 
had investigated total returns, while Yadev and Pope analyze 
seasonalities in ex post realised risk premia. The researchers 
point out that the study of total share returns may depend , at 
least partially, on the level of the risk-free rate of interest. 
They argue that returns should be equal for all days of the week, 
if the interest component is deducted from observed returns. Such 
an adjustment eliminates the settlement period effect43 • In 
addition, Yadev and Pope, studied intraday seasonalities in the 
U.K. market and found that prices tended to rise systematically 
during the first hour of trade. This observation is consistent 
with the U.S. market (Harris,1986). They also documented a 
systematic fall in share prices between 2p.m. - 3p.m. This could 
be due to the opening of the U. s. market and the added 
uncertainty as to what will happen in this market. However, this 
appears unlikely, since such a negative return was also 
documented between 2p.m. - 3p.m. in the U.S. market. It appears 
that yet another anomaly exists in the share markets! 
Unfortunately such a study on the JSE is not be possible due to 
the lack of data. The only database available is on the closing 
values of the All Share Index, Industrial Index and the Gold 
Index. No intraday data is available, and the opening value of 
the index is not available. 
2.9 Summary of Chapter Two 
The history of share markets shows that prices fluctuate widely 
41The trading time hypothesis assumes that returns are 
generated during trading time. Thus returns should, on average, 
be generated at the same rate during trading time. However, 
Harris' research shows that there is a striking difference 
between Monday and the other weekdays in the first forty five 
minutes of trade. Mondays mean return in the first forty five 
minutes is significantly negative, while on the other weekdays 
it is significantly positive. 
42None of the research documented an example of a profitable 
trading strategy once trading costs are accounted for. 
43It should be noted that while Yadev and Pope study ex post 
realised risk premia, several other researchers had already made 
adjustments for the settlement period effect. The contributions 
of these other researchers in the field of settlement effects has 












over time. At least part of the reason for these price changes 
is that new information arrives, and investors re-assess share 
values based on this information. Whether share prices adjust 
quickly or correctly to this new information is a question that 
has received particular attention. The efficient market theory 
holds that prices instantaneously reflect all available new 
information. The theory is sub-divided into three levels of 
efficiency based upon the type of information that is available 
to the potential investor. These three forms of efficiency are 
the weak form, the semi-strong form and the strong form. The 
classifications depend upon the level of information that might 
be utilised to earn excess returns. 
Weak form efficiency states that one cannot earn excess returns 
by utilising historical information. This implies that technical 
analysts are wasting their time by investigating charts depicting 
seemingly regular share price patterns. 
In an efficient financial market, costless44 trading policies 
will not generate excess returns. Clearly, any regular price 
pattern which can be exploited to produce consistent excess 
returns, after taking trading costs into account, would 
contradict the efficient market hypothesis. However, seemingly 
regular return patterns have been documented and have come to be 
known as seasonalities. One of these seasonalities is the Weekend 
Effect and forms the basis of this study. These returns have all 
been based on some particular time period. The word "appears" is 
used, because it may be that the time period does earn above 
average returns, BUT there may be a logical reason for this 
"excess" return - for example, dividends are declared by most 
companies in July, giving rise to an increase in price in that 
month. Thus the apparent "excess" return can be explained by the 
price now going cum-di vidend45 • A variety of explanations for the 
Weekend Effect were presented in Chapter Two. 
The study of returns automatically implies a time period. A 
return on an investment is always related to the period of the 
investment. Thus the generation of share returns is integral to 
any study involving returns. This particular study focuses on the 
mechanism by which share returns are generated. Two basic 
hypotheses have been developed. The trading time hypothesis which 
states that the share returns are only generated while the market 
is open, while the calendar time hypothesis asserts that share 
44Costless trading policies imply that there are no 
transaction costs. There are additional costs in the form of 
gathering information - direct costs, such as computer systems 
(i.e. Reuters, I-Net), newspapers etc. and indirect costs, such 
as the opportunity cost of the time spent gathering information . 
. 
45If a share trades cum-dividend it implies that the 
purchaser will receive the declared dividend. However, the trade 
will be after dividend declaration date, and thus the share will 













returns are generated over time - irrespective of whether the 
market is open or closed. 
Seasonalities in share market returns were discovered as early 
as 1930. Studies indicate that returns are not consistent the 
calendar hypotheses. There is some evidence that returns are 
generated in trading time. One characteristic common to all of 
these studies is the negative Monday return. An extension of this 
phenomenon was the above average returns, generally observed on 
Fridays. This would appear to contradict all logic - one would 
expect investors to sell shares on a Friday, rather than hold 
over the weekend when events could unfold that may have a 
negative impact on share prices. 
Consequently, the study of negative Monday returns was extended 
to become the study of the Weekend Effect. However, some 
controversy still exists as to whether the Weekend Effect is 
simply a part of the closed market effect. The closed market 
effect includes studies relating to all market closings, and 
includes the Weekend Effect and the Public Holiday Effect. 
Regardless of the name that one attaches to this anomaly, it 
still appears to contradict the efficient market hypothesis. For 
this reason new studies appear to have shifted their focus. The 
researchers tried to find explanations for the anomaly. Several 
explanations were documented, but none appeared to fully explain 
the existence of the Weekend Effect. Among the explanations are 
two that are particularly applicable to the JSE. These are the 
interest effects of settlement delays and dividend effects. 
International studies go on to consider exactly when these excess 
returns accrue. Is it during trading time, or non-trading time? 
Contradictory results were obtained. Rogalski's (1984) results 
indicate that the negative return accrues over the non-trading 
weekend. Harris (1986) documented that for large firms the 
negative return accrues over the weekend, while for small firms 
the negative Monday return accrues during trade on Monday. Yadev 
and Pope (1991) found that returns on the London Stock Exchange 
accrue during trade on Monday. 
Unfortunately such a study is not possible on the JSE due to the 
lack of data regarding the opening levels of the indices and the 
intraday values of the indices. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the most recent 
developments in the study of seasonalities. These developments 
relate to research on intraday returns on share indices. In 
addition the chapter discusses where this study will improve on 
previous studies, and compares the JSE with research on 













ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND DATA SET 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with a description of the data and the 
econometric models used to analyse this data. The data set 
consists of the daily closing values of the All Share Index, 
Industrial Index and the Gold Index for the period 26 February 
1986 - 29 September 1993. As has been mentioned, previous South 
African {and several international) studies have only considered 
an "all share" index. This is the first time that an industrial 
and gold index are separately analysed and compared to the "all 
share" index. Apart from the obvious advantage of gaining an 
insight into the previously unstudied industrial and gold 
indices, it allows assessment of the impact these "sub" indices 
have on the all share index. 
The econometric models are similar to those that have been 
employed by other researchers in international studies. This has 
the advantage of making the results directly comparable to 
international findings. In this manner the study can be used to 
address the similarities or differences between international 
findings and the JSE. 
This chapter defines return, and describes the manner in which 
returns on the indices are calculated. These returns are be 
analysed for the whole study period as well as for sub-periods. 
A risk-adjusted return is explained and discussed. The calendar 
and trading time regression equations originally used by French 
{1980) are explained in the context of the JSE. In addition, 
econometric models are presented which adjust for settlement 
delays and dividend effects. 
However, before commencing on the study of any indices, one needs 
to be aware of the "workings" of such indices. The analysis of 
the indices includes the objectives of indices, a brief review 
of the development of the indices, and their calculation. These 
topics are now discussed. 
3.2 History of the indices 
1 November 1978 saw the launch of the JSE Actuaries Equity 
Indices. These were to replace the Rand Daily Mail {ROM) Indices, 
and thus, for the sake of continuity, the Actuaries' Indices 
opening levels were linked to the ROM Indices. In addition the 
Indices were re-calculated back to 1960. Consequently there are 
thirty three years {1960 -1993) of data available, but 
unfortunately only the last five years of data is stored on 
computer. It is for this reason that Bhana's study only included 












seven and a half years of data. (1986 - 1993). In this study, it 
has been possible to include an extra two and a half years of 
data, since the database has been enhanced. However, this is an 
advantage of the study, since the combination of the two studies' 
results yields a net twelve and a half year study period. The 
longer study period will align more closely with international 
studies1 • It is true that there is a three year gap between the 
two studies, but the combined studies imply a gross fifteen year 
study period (1978 - 1993), with twelve and a half of these years 
being subject to similar statistical analysis. 
3.3 Objectives of the indices 
The primary objective of an index 
"is to provide a standard against which portfolio 
performance can be measured objectively." (JSE 
Actuaries Indices 1993) 
It is interesting to note that the All Share Index has 
outperformed six out of eight SA unit trust investment funds over 
the last fifteen years. The All Share Index has returned 26,6% 
annually on average, while the funds have ranged from a low of 
22,3% to a high of 28,2%. [The Star 9/5/93 - Quoting statistics 
from studies performed by Dr Lampbrechts. ] (These statistics 
certainly lend credibility to the recent introduction of Index 
Funds in South Africa2 .) 
In addition there are several secondary objectives: 
- to provide a description of the market at a point in time in 
terms of price levels, dividend yields and earnings yields. 
- to provide investors with more sophisticated tools to manage 
their risk exposures, e.g. futures and option contracts based 
on the indices. 
- to provide data to facilitate equity research. 
- to provide a yardstick against which portfolio performance can 
be measured. 
1International studies, discussed in Chapter Two, have been 
based on up to thirty years of data. 
2The objective of an Index Fund is to match the returns of 
a underlying index. To achieve this the portfolio of shares in 
the fund must match the shares included in the index. It is 
vitally important that the percentage weighting of a share in the 
index is the same as its percentage weighting in the Index Fund. 
In this manner the returns on the Index Fund would match the 
underlying index. This objective differs from that of unit trust 
investment funds which seek to "beat" the market. This implies 
that the returns on the fund exceed the returns on the underlying 
index. The higher returns are, according to the investment funds, 












3.4 Calculation of the indices 
The indices are calculated using a weighted arithmetic average 
method. This is achieved by selecting a representative sample of 
JSE shares. Shares selected should be representative in terms of 
both the direction of movement of the market, and the magnitude 
of such movements. The selection of the index constituents is 
primarily based on market capitalisation3 • There are other 
qualifying criteria which are discussed in detail in the JSE 
Index Bulletin. However, one of the more important guidelines for 
inclusion relates to the tradeability of the shares. Selection 
of shares that have a low "number of traded shares to number of 
issued shares" ratio are avoided4 • 
The basic procedure for calculating any JSE index, is to list all 
the shares of each sector in declining magnitude of market 
capitalisation. Companies are successively selected until 
approximately 80% of the total market capitalisation of that 
sector has been included in the index. A weighting procedures 
then occurs, to ensure that the important shares command a 
heavier weight in the index. 
The share price used in the calculation is the latest transaction 
price on the date of calculation. If no sale price is available, 
but a higher buyer's price or lower seller's price is recorded, 
then this as used. It should be emphasised that fluctuations in 
share prices (and thus index values) due to dividend declarations 
are not adjusted for, "as any adjustment would be largely 
subjective." (Actuarial Index Bulletin, 1993) 
This study adjusts for the impact of dividend announcements on 
the indices. Dividend announcements impact share prices on the 
last day to register (LDR). In an efficient market one would 
expect the share price to fall6 by the present value7 of the 
3Market capitalisation is the product of the companies' 
share price multiplied by the number of shares in issue of that 
company. 
411 Consideration is given to the volume of shares traded when 
selecting companies. If the proportion of shares traded to total 
number of issued shares has been exceedingly small over the past 
few years, the inclusion of the company is avoided if possible." 
(JSE Index Bulletin, 1993) 
SWeighting is done by means of market capitalisation. The 
weighting formulae is detailed in the JSE Index Bulletin. 
611 After a share has gone ex dividend, the purchaser does not 
acquire the right to receive the declared dividend, and so the 
share price drops accordingly" (Board and Sutcliffe, 1988) The 
share price drops because the purchaser has lost the right to 
receive a certain future cashflow. A component of the share 
price, after dividend declaration date but prior to LDR, is for 












dividend on the day AFTER the LDR. The negative Monday return 
could be due to the fact that a disproportionately large 
percentage of shares making up the index have their LDR's on a 
Friday. This implies that the share prices should fall on Monday 
by the present value of the dividend declared. Thus the dividend 
effect may be an explanation of the negative Monday return, but 
only if a disproportionately large percentage of shares making 
up the index have LDR' s on a Friday. · This study needs to 
determine the frequency of LDR's, for shares making up the 
indices, across the different weekdays, and make an adjustment 
for the potential dividend effect. The magnitude of this 
adjustment should be proportional to the size of the lost 
dividend {Board and Sutcliffe, 1988). The magnitude of the 
dividends for a particular index can be obtained from the 
dividend yield on that index. Thus the adjustment should equal 
the dividend yield on the index being studied {Solnik, 1990). 
3.5 Data set 
The data used in this study consists of the daily closing value · 
of the: 
i) All Share Index 
ii) Industrial Index 
iii) Gold Index. 
This data was obtained from the Ivor Jones, Roy & Co. Inc. 
database for the period 26 February 1986 - 29 September 1993. 
Thus, the data contains one thousand nine hundred and eighty six 
weekdays. However, during this period, there were a total of 
seventy six public holidays. The breakdown of the public holidays 
per weekday is given in Table A: 
is buying and the seller is selling. After LDR the right to this 
cashflow is not included in the share price, and thus the share 
price drops by the amount of the declared dividend. 
7The present value is for the period from the day after the 
LDR to the actual dividend payment date {i.e. when cash is paid 













Public Holidays in the study period 
DAY NUMBER OF PUBLIC HOLIDAYS 
Monday 22 days 
Tuesday 9 days 
Wednesday 9 days 
Thursday 14 days 
Friday 22 days 
TOTAL 76 days 
It is clear from Table A that Mondays and Fridays account for 
more than half of the public holidays. It is possible that the 
uneven distribution of public holidays has a significant impact 
on the Weekend Effect. This possibility is considered at a later 
stage of the chapter. Thus, there are approximately one thousand 
nine hundred and ten closing values of the indices. All of the 
statistical tests are based on these observations. 
A problem is encountered on public holidays, since no index value 
is available. Therefore it is not possible to perform tests for 
these days, as all of the statistical tests utilise the closing 
index value, and there is no closing index value for a public 
holiday. In the first statistical test public holidays are 
ignored, and the day after the public holiday is compared to the 
day before the public holiday. For example, if there is a 
Wednesday public holiday, then it is effectively deleted from the 
dataset. The Thursday closing index level would be compared to 
the Tuesday closing index level. 
It is useful to break the All Share Index into its components in 
order to obtain an understanding of the data that is employed. 
An analysis of the All Share Index shows that the following 
indices contribute to its make-up: 
Table B 
Indices Contributing to the All Share Index 
Coal 0.84% 
Diamonds 7.23% Mining Prod. 19.75% 
All Gold 7.21% 
Metals & Minerals 4.47% 
Mining Houses 11.99% Mining Fin. 16.61% 
Mining Holding 4.62% 
Financial 16.30% Fin & Ind 63.64% 
Industrial 47.34% 












Source: Ivor Jones, & Roy Co. Inc. 
From Table B, it is clear how the JSE All Share Index is unique 
in comparison to international share markets, due to the 
influence of the gold/mining sector. It should be noted that the 
mining sector contributes 36% (19.75% + 16.61%) towards the All 
Share Index, while the Financial and Industrial Indices 
contribute the remaining 64%. For this reason the study analyses 
the All Share Index, Industrial Index and Gold Index separately. 
It may be that the Industrial Index displays similar share return 
patterns when compared to the share return patterns on 
international share markets. However, gold shares may have 
atypical behaviour (Bradfield, 1990), and thus the Industrial and 
Gold Indices should be studied separately. Only once it has been 
ascertained as to whether gold shares have a unique impact on the 
All Share Index, will it be possible to comment on the behaviour 
of the All Share Index in relation to international share 
markets. (i.e. with regard to the Weekend Effect.) 
Appendix A gives a list of the top contributors to the All Share 
Index. It should be noted that: 
- 5 shares make up 28% of the All Share Index 
- 10 shares make up 44% of the All Share Index 
- 20 shares make up 62% of the All Share Index 
- 30 shares make up 74% of the All Share Index 
- 50 shares make up 88% of the All Share Index 
The above statistics make it abundantly clear how large an 
influence a small number of shares have on the index. It would 
almost certainly be possible to influence the level of the index 
by influencing the prices of the top ten shares. Components of 
the Industrial Index and Gold Index are also listed in Appendix 
A. From these lists it is noted that: 
- 5 shares make up 96.36% of the Gold Index 
- 5 shares make up 36.13% of the Industrial Index 
3.6 Limitations of the data 
Unfortunately it is not possible to obtain the perfect data set. 
For this reason it is important that the limitations of the data 
used in this study are acknowledged. Any future research should 
be aware of these limitations; moreover they must be taken into 
account when assessing conclusions. The following limitations are 
applicable to this data set. 
1) Only the closing value of the index is available. There is 
no openinq value available for any of the JSE indices. Thus 
there is no manner to determine whether the negative Monday 
return accrues over the non-trading weekend, or if it is a 












international studies8 have analysed returns from the open-
to-closing value of an index on any particular weekday. 
These studies have allowed the researchers to determine 
whether the negative return accrues during trade on Monday, 
or whether it arises over the non-trading weekend. 
2) No intradaily data on the indices is available. 
Consequently there is no way in which international 
intraday studies can be replicated at this point in time. 
Overseas studies9 have managed to identify intradaily 
seasonalities. Without this data it is impossible to 
determine whether similar patterns exist on the JSE. 
Intradaily data has allowed other researchers to determine 
exactly when returns accrue during the day - in particular 
when the negative Monday return and positive Friday returns 
accrue. 
3) Only 8 years of data is available. This is significantly 
less than some of the overseas studies, which have an 
average twenty-year period. However, as previously 
mentioned, this study adds to Bhana's results, and provides 
a longer study period on the JSE. In addition Bhana's study 
was based on five years of data, while this study covers an 
eight year study period - which implies that this study 
period is 60% longer than Bhana's study. Combining the two 
study periods yields a thirteen year study period. 
4) The JSE is infamous for its illiquidity. This has been 
discussed at length, and it should be noted that this can 
lead to observed prices not equalling underlying or true 
prices. However, mitigation of this potential limitation of 
the data, is made due to the JSE Actuaries Department 
selection criteria. One of the selection criteria requires 
that shares included in the indices are regularly traded. 
Thus shares prices used are likely to be a fair reflection 
of the underlying or true prices 
5) The data consists of the unadjusted closing values of the 
indices. Thus, the effect of dividends and settlement 
delays on the indices has not been removed. However, this 
is not a serious limitation, as this study proposes to 
8See for example Rogalski (1984) who found that the negative 
Monday return accrues between the Friday close and the Monday 
open. In addition, it was noted that the Monday open-to-close 
return was the same as other days of the week. Harris (1986) 
found that the negative Monday return accrues over the non-
trading weekend for large firms, while the negative Monday return 
accrues during the trading period on Monday for small shares. 
9Examples of intradaily studies include: Harris (1986) on 
New York Stock Exchange data and Yadev & Pope (1991) on U.K. 












adjust for the effect of any dividends10 • 
3.7 Econometric models 
Most of the econometric models used in this study are a 
replication of models applied by other researchers on return 
anomalies in international share markets. This is an advantage 
since it makes the results of this study comparable to other 
studies. Thus it is possible to compare and contrast share price 
patterns found on the South African market to patterns on 
international markets. 
The first exercise is to establish a numerical table detailing 
the number of positive and negative returns11 that are in 
evidence on each weekday during the study period. This gives a 
description of the data set by detailing the number of positive, 
negative and nil returns for each day of the week. It also helps 
to give an indication as to whether any of the results obtained 
are influenced by outliers, since the exercise also details the 
maximum and minimum returns within the data set. In addition, it 
indicates if any particular day has an abnormally large number 
of positive or negative returns. This study employs the same 
methodology as that used by Cross (1973) and French (1980). 
The second exercise calculates the daily returns of the indices. 
Return has been defined and calculated in the same manner as all 
of the international studies12 , and is merely a comparison of the 
closing value of the index to the closing value of the index on 
the preceding day. At this point no adjustment is made for 
dividends or settlement delays. These form the subject of later 
exercises in this thesis. Returns are defined as: 
Ri = * 100% 
where: 
Ri = Daily return on the index for day t 
Xi = Closing value of the index on day t 
Xi-1 = Closing value of the index on the previous day (t-1) 
Thus the formula represents the ~losing value of the index on day 
Xt, minus the closing value of the index on the previous day (Xi_1) 
divided by the closing value of the index on the previous day (Xi_ 
i). The returns are then expressed in percentage form. 
1°Refer to section 3.7 for a discussion on how dividends are 
adjusted for. 
11The method for the calculation of return has been defined 
in equation {l} below. 
12The international studies are too long to list. Refer to 












There is no point in analysing returns in isolation. It is also 
necessary to consider the risk versus reward relationship. It may 
be that Friday returns are higher than the returns on the other 
days of the week. However, this may be due to higher risk. The 
risk of a particular day is measured by the variance13 in that 
day's returns. The higher the variance in the returns the more 
risky the investment. Thus the study needs to evaluate daily 
returns relative to the daily risk in those returns. Only in 1990 
did Ariel considered the risk versus return (reward) relationship 
in the study of seasonalities. In his study of high share returns 
before holidays, he adjusted daily returns for the daily variance 
in those returns. This study performs a similar exercise, and 
represents the first time that such an adjustment is made in the 
study of intraweek returns on the JSE. The daily returns should 
be divided by the standard deviation of that days return so that 
all days returns have a common variance14 • If all days have a 
common variance, and variance is a measure of risk, then all 
day's returns have the same risk. In this manner risk adjusted 
returns can be compared, which means that any excess returns on 
a particular weekday are not a reward for bearing extra risk. If 
all of the returns have a common variance, they can be compared 
on the same risk basis. Thus the returns are adjusted for risk. 
The following equation serves to illustrate the statistical 
procedure that will be performed. 




Ri = as defined in equati n {1}. 
S.D. = Square Root of the variance of the daily returns. 
The evaluation needs to remove large "outliers" from the sample, 
to avoid possible distortion in the resul ts15 • An additional item 
considered is the elimination of Friday the 13th returns. It is 
possible that the returns on these days are abnormal in some 
13Variance is a measure of how much returns change over a 
period of time. The larger the percentage change in returns, the 
larger the potential loss or reward. Associated with the large 
changes in returns is risk. Variance is a measure of how much 
returns change over a time period. As such variance is a measure 
of risk. 
14Per consul tat ion with Prof. Wegner {UCT Statistical 
Sciences Department) • This manipulation ensures that returns for 
each day of the week have a variance of one. Thus all weekdays 
have the same variance, and hence the same risk. 
1511outliers" are data points that are abnormally high or low, 
and are not representative of the rest of the data set. The 
outliers may have been caused by some extraordinary factor - an 
example may be that of the 19 October 1987 "crash". This 
methodology is used by Yadev & Pope (1991) and is recommended by 












manner due to possible phycological effects on this day16 • It is 
possible that potentially abnormal returns on these days will 
impact on the statistical analysis. 
The third exercise replicates French's (1980) tests. Bhana (1985) 
performed a similar test. This exercise establishes whether there 
have been any significant changes with respect to the trading and 
calendar time hypotheses in the last ten years. These are 
expressed by the following regression equations: 
Trading Time -
y I = A + B2D2 + B3D3 + B4D4 + B5D5 + E 
where: 
Y'= Return on the index being studied. 
A = Expected return for Monday. 
{2} 
B2, B3 , B4 , & B5 represent the difference between the 
expected return for Monday and the expected return for 
each of the other days of the week. 
D2, D3 , D4 , & D5 represent dummy variables for Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. If the observation 
falls on a Tuesday, then 02 = 1. If the observation 
does not fall on a Tuesday, then 0 2 = O. The same 
applies for the other weekdays. 
E = Disturbance factor. 
The trading time hypothesis assumes that returns are generated 
only during trading time. All days of the week have an equal 
period of trading time and thus all days of the week should have 
equal returns. The above regression equation tests whether 
Monday's return is equal to all of the other weekdays by studying 
the difference between Monday's returns and the other weekdays 
returns. If Mondays returns are equal to the other weekdays 
returns, then B21 B31 B4 , & B5 will all be close to zero and an F-
statistic measuring the joint significance of the dummy variables 
should be insignificant (French, 1980). If the F-statistic is 
insignificant then we can conclude that returns are indeed 
generated only during trading time. 
Calendar Time -
Y' = A(1+2D1 ) + B2D2 + B3D3 + B4D4 + B5D5 + E .•••• {3} 
where: 
0 1 = Dummy variable for Monday. ( ie 0 1 = 1 if the observation 
falls on Monday, otherwise it is= O.) 
A = One-third of the expected return for Monday. 
16It is widely believed by the superstitious that Friday the 
13th is an unlucky day. It is possible that this belief will 
affect share returns in some abnormal manner. In order to address 
this possibility, returns for these day are omitted in an 
exercise to determine if Friday the 13th has any abnormal effect 
on share returns. This procedure is the same as that adopted by 
Bhana (1993), who states that "in a class by itself - almost 
considered an antithesis of a holiday by the superstitious - is 












B2 , B3 , B4 , & B5 represent the difference between one-third 
of the expected return for Monday and the expected 
return for each of the other days of the week. 
Other variables = as per equation {2} 
The calendar time hypothesis assumes that returns are generated 
during calender time, and thus Monday represents a three calendar 
day investment. For this reason, returns must be three times 
larger on Monday to compensate for the longer calendar time 
investment. Thus regression {3} tests if Monday's return is equal 
to the returns of the other days of the week, after the necessary 
adjustment of dividing Monday's return by three. 
The calendar and trading time hypotheses are tested by means of 
the regression equations described above. These equations are 
identical to those used by, amongst others, French {1980) and 
Bhana {1985). 
The fourth exercise involves adjusting the daily returns for the 
effects of settlement delays. This means adjusting for interest 
rate effects in settlement period asymmetries. The following 
formula is used to adjust the daily returns for the effects of 
settlement delays17 : 
Adjusted Return = Ri - y {4} 
where: 
Ri = Daily return on the index as defined in equation {1} 
y = Daily risk free interest rate 
on 30 May 1991, the settlement period changed from fourteen 
business days to seven business days. 
With no public holidays the returns prior to 30 May 1991 are 
adjusted as follows: 
Table c 
Fourteen Business Day Settlement Period 
I Share Purchase Date I[ Settlement Date II Number of days I 
Monday 1st Thursday 18th 18 days 
Tuesday 2nd Friday 19th 18 days 
Wednesday 3rd Monday 22nd 20 days 
Thursday 4th Tuesday 23rd 20 days 
Friday 5th Wednesday 24th 20 days 
Table c, reveals that purchasers on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday 
have an extra two days in which to settle their payment for 
shares. Thus the purchaser obtains an extra two days of interest-













free credit from the seller. It is hypothesised that the rational 
investor adjusts share prices for these two days of interest-free 
credit. Therefore, index values on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday 
should also be adjusted downwards for two days of interest. The 
adjustment of index values downwards on Wednesday, Thursday and 
Friday is equivalent to adjusting Wednesday returns downwards and 
Monday returns upwards by two days of risk-free interest. This 
is because returns, as defined in equation {1}, are a comparison 
of the closing value of the index to the preceding day's closing 
index value18 • 
The next step is to choose which interest rate should be used to 
adjust the returns on the indices. The risk-free interest rate 
is the appropriate rate to use. Lakonishok & Levi (1982) used the 
prime rate as their risk free interest rate. Theobald & Price's 
(1984) article does not make it clear as to what they use as 
their risk free interest rate. Dyl & Martin (1985) use the 
overnight federal funds rate to adjust for settlement effects. 
Jaffe & Westerfield (1985) and Board & Sutcliffe (1988) adjust 
for interest effects in another manner. They do not adjust 
returns by an interest rate, but calculate what implicit rate of 
interest would result in returns being equal across the different 
days of the week19 • This study adopts the approach taken by 
Lakonishok & Levi, since there are several factors that could 
impact on returns across weekdays. Thus, it is more appropriate 
to adjust the returns for interest effects, rather than to 
compute an implicit interest rate. In this study the Bankers 
Acceptance Rate (BA Rate) is used. This is obtained on a daily 
basis for the period under review. 
Table D 
Seven Busine s Day Settlement Period 
I Share Purchase Date II Settlement Date II Number of days I 
Monday 1st Tuesday 9th 9 days 
Tuesday 2nd Wednesday 10th 9 days 
Wednesday 3rd Thursday 11th 9 days 
Thursday 4th Friday 12th 9 days 
Friday 5th Monday 15th 11 days 
Table D indicates how the more recent seven business day 
settlement period impacts on receipts and payments. Buyers now 
18An alternative procedure is to adjust Monday and Tuesday 
index values upwards by two days of interest, but all previous 
studies have adjusted returns - for example Lakonishok & Levi 
(1982) and Theobald & Price (1984). 
19Note that this approach has its problems, since it assumes 
that all differences in weekday returns are caused by interest 
effects. The longer and more correct approach is to adjust 












find that only Friday purchases result in an extra two days of 
interest-free credit. This has been caused by a weekend falling 
between purchase date and settlement date. Presumably, rational 
investors factor the extra two-day interest-free settlement into 
the price of the shares. For this reason any analysis should 
adjust Friday returns downwards by two days of risk-free 
interest, and Monday returns upwards by two days of risk-free 
interest. 
It is noted that in order to adjust for settlement delays, 
returns must be adjusted downwards by the number of extra 
interest-free settlement days there are for purchasers. The data 
are sub-divided into two periods: 
(1) prior to 30 May 1991: Wednesday returns to be 
adjusted downwards and Monday returns to be adjusted 
upwards by two days of risk free interest. 
(2) after 30 May 1991: Friday returns to be adjusted 
downwards and Monday returns to be adjusted upwards by 
two days of risk free interest. 
It should be noted that the above analysis fails to take into 
account the effect of public holidays. Public holidays have a 
complex impact on the settlement procedures. This is illustrated 
with an example of a Wednesday public holiday, combined with a 
seven day settlement period: 
Table E 
Public Holidays and a seven day settlement period 
Share Purchase Date Settlement Date Number of Days 
Monday 12th Wednesday 21st 10 days 
Tuesday 13th Thursday 22nd 10 days 
Wednesday 14th N/A N/A 
Thursday 15th Friday 23rd 9 days 
Friday 16th Monday 26th 11 days 
From Table E it can be seen how public holidays impact on the 
settlement procedure for trades up to a week before the public 
holiday. In fact the holiday on Wednesday 14th causes shares 
purchased from Tuesday 6th to Tuesday 13th to have one extra 
settlement day. Thus public holidays cause settlement delays to 
be altered in a more complex manner. In theory adjustment for the 
settlement delays caused by public holidays is required. However, 
for the purposes of this paper, public holidays are not adjusted 
for, since it is' considered unlikely that the average investor 












random basis20 • 
The fifth test examines the effects of dividends. As discussed 
previously share prices, in theory, drop by the amount of the 
dividend after the LDR. If company's LDR's do not fall randomly 
on the five weekdays, it could lead to an inequality in returns 
across the days of the week. Previous South African studies have 
not researched this possibility. Most have recognised that 
dividends do have an impact on share prices. However, in order 
to adjust for the effects of dividends, they simply subtract the 
average dividend yield from the daily returns. This procedure 
assumes that companies LDR's fall randomly across weekdays. This 
assumption may be at odds with economic reality. In fact, it 
appears to violate le Wet's (1992) observation that most 
companies' LDR's fall on a Friday. 
This study proposes to determine the daily distribution of LDR's 
for shares forming the All Share Index. Only in this manner that 
is it possible to adjust daily returns for the effects of shares 
going ex-dividend. This process determines on which days shares 
forming the All Share Index have their LDR's. However, for 
simplicity, only shares forming 75% of the index, i.e. the top 
40 shares, are considered. On this basis the study can determine 
if shares have their LDR's on a particular weekday. If it is 
found that the LDR's fall on a particular weekday, then it is 
necessary to adjust the returns of the day after LDR upwards by 
the amount of the dividend yield on the index. This methodology 
is used by Board and Sutcliffe (1988) and Solnik (1990). 
The sixth exercise evaluates the impact of the bid-ask bias in 
the pricing of index constituents. The closing price is the price 
at which the share last traded, except when there has been a lack 
of activity, in which case there may be cause to use the bid 
price or the ask price. It is possible that the use of ask prices 
on a Friday would lead to an increase in the returns for Fridays. 
However, use of bid prices on a Monday may lead to a decline in 
the returns for Mondays. 
This possibility is investigated by taking a selection of Fridays 
and Mondays. For the days selected, the study determines what 
price was used for a number of shares making up the indices - was 
it the last trade price, bid price or ask price? This allows one 
to make a judgement as to whether there is a bid-ask bias causing 
inequality in returns across days of the week. 
The seventh exercise addresses various statistical assumptions 
about the data. This test will not be performed in isolation, but 
is rather addressed as each of the other tests is undertaken. 
More discussion about this topic is presented as each of the 
tests is performed in Chapter Four. 
20It should be remembered that in this example we have looked 
at a seven day settlement period. When there was a fourteen day 
settlement period, the returns would in theory be affected for 












The eighth exercise cannot be performed in isolation, since it 
involves almost all of the previous tests. In fact, this exercise 
is performed in conjunction with each of the previous exercises. 
It is simply a commentary on the differences or similarities 
between the results of the All Share Index, Industrial Index and 
Gold Index. This may have implications for tradeability, as one 
index may be more tradeable21 in comparison to the other indices. 
It is emphasised that this is the first time that indices other 
than the All Share Index have been subject to empirical analysis. 
This represents an important contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge, since nothing is known about day of the week 
effects on the Industrial Index and the Gold Index. It will be 
interesting to ascertain as to whether the indices display 
identical return patterns, or whether there are significant 
differences between return patterns. 
All of the previous exercises have adjusted for various potential 
explanations of the weekend effect in isolation. These studies 
are important, since they show what portion of the Weekend Effect 
can be explained by each of the potential explanations. However, 
all of these factors work simultaneously in a dynamic 
environment. This is an area in which this study proposes to 
improve upon previous studies. This study performs a test where 
all of the adjustments are performed simultaneously. It is 
possible that the Weekend Effect is a result of a number of 
factors working in combination. It may be that when all of these 
factors are adjusted for in one test, then the Weekend Effect 
disappears - that is, if a Weekend Effect is in existence in 
South Africa. 
3.8 summary of Chapter Three 
The chapter began by giving a brief history and discussing the 
objectives of the indices. Indices are calculated using a 
weighted arithmetic average. This means that shares are listed 
in order of market capitalisation, and the top 80% of each index 
is selected. These shares then form the basis of the indices. 
The chapter then becomes more specific and focuses on the data 
used in this study. The data consists of the daily closing values 
of the All Share, Industrial and Gold Indices for the period. The 
various limitations of this data are then highlighted. The two 
main limitations are that there is no intradaily or opening index 
values available. 
Once the shortcomings of the data have been discussed, the tests 
to be performed are briefly explained. These tests can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. a.) Number of positive and negative returns for each 
weekday, for each index. 
2. a.) Daily returns on the All Share Index, Industrial 
Index and Gold Index. 
21one index may be composed of shares that are traded more 





















Daily returns relative to the daily variance of 
these returns. 
Trading Time Hypothesis. 
Calendar Time Hypothesis. 
Adjusting returns for settlement delays. 
Adjusting for the effects of dividends. 
Adjusting for the effects of the bid-ask bias. 
Addressing the statistical assumptions in the 
previous tests. 
Comparison of the three indices on all the tests 
performed. 
Adjusting for all influencing factors 
simultaneously. 
Most of these tests are based on the same methodology used by 
international researchers. This approach is useful since the 
results of this study can be compared to international findings. 
Thus daily share return patterns on the JSE can be compared to 













EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter deals with a discussion of the data used in the 
study, and an analysis of the results obtained from the tests 
described in Chapter Three. 
The database consists of the closing1 values of the All Share 
Index, Industrial Index and Gold Index from 26 February 1986 to 
29 September 1993. Thus there are one thousand nine hundred and 
eighty six weekdays. However, during this period, there were a 
total of seventy six public holidays on which the JSE was closed 
and no index value is available. The public holidays have been 
detailed in Chapter Three, Table A. Thus there are a total of one 
thousand nine hundred and ten closing values of the indices, on 
which the statistical tests are based. 
4.1 Number of positive and negative returns on each weekday 
The first test is to establish the number of positive and 
negative returns for each day of the week for each of the 
indices. This task was performed using Lotus software. Returns 
were calculated by performing equation {1} detailed in Chapter 
Three. (As a reminder, the calculation involves dividing the 
difference between todays' closing value and yesterdays' closing 
value, by yesterdays' closing value. For example, Monday's 
closing value would have Friday's closing value deducted from it, 
and the difference would be divided by the closing level of the 
index on Friday.) 
A problem is encountered with public holidays, since markets are 
closed and no index value is available. Thus it is not possible 
to perform tests for these days. In the first exercise public 
holidays are ignored, and the day after the public holiday is 
compared to the day before the public holiday. For example, if 
there was a Wednesday public holiday, then it is effectively 
deleted from the dataset. Thursday's closing index level is be 
compared with Tuesday's closing index level. This approach is 
used by French2 , and results of this study are presented in Table 
1 The closing value is defined as the value of the index as 
calculated by the JSE Actuaries department from share prices at 
16.00H on a daily basis. 
2As with French (1980), the tests were reperformed by 
omitting any returns for a period that includes a holiday. In the 
above example, the Thursday return would have been omitted from 
the dataset. The t-statistic results of this test are presented 
in Table L. The returns are recorded in Appendix B and are almost 
















Results from first test on the Indices 
Number of Positive. Negative and Nil Returns 
Page 56 
ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD INDEX 
+VE NIL -VE +VE NIL -VE +VE NIL -VE 
175 10 189 176 17 181 175 6 193 
207 6 175 218 11 159 187 9 192 
Wednesday 216 6 167 227 12 150 201 7 181 
Thursday 206 10 167 227 8 148 187 4 192 
Friday 191 9 175 198 20 157 167 8 200 
TOTAL 995 41 873 1046 68 795 917 34 958 
Table F is set out in the following manner. The first column for 
each of the indices shows the number of positive returns, the 
second column shows the number of nil returns and the third 
column shows the number of negative returns. For example, on 
Monday, reading from left to right in Table F, there were a total 
of one hundred and seventy five positive returns, ten nil returns 
and one hundred and eighty nine negative returns on the All Share 
Index. 
The first point to note is that the number of nil returns appear 
to show no particular pattern across the days of the week. For 
this reason, they can be dismissed as having no material impact 
on the study of intraweek returns. (If anything, there tend to 
be a greater number of nil returns on Mondays and Fridays.) 
It will be noticed that on all of the indices, there are a larger 
number of negative returns than positive returns on Mondays. For 
the All Share and I dustrial Indices, there are a larger number 
of positive returns than negative returns on the other four 
weekdays. This is the first indication of the negative Monday 
phenomena. It is interesting to note that the Gold Index has a 
larger number of negative returns on all days of the week, except 
Wednesdays. It would appear as if the Gold Index exhibits 
atypical behaviour when compared to the All Share and Industrial 
Indices. In addition the total number of positive returns exceed 
the total number of negative returns on both the All Share and 
Industrial Indices. However, the converse is true for the Gold 
Index. The number of positive returns on the All Share Index 
exceed the negative returns by 14%. However, with the Industrial 
Index, the percentage increases to 32% - over double. There can 
be little doubt that this is due to the influence of the gold 
post holiday returns is common to the methodology used by French 












shares on the All Share Index. From this observation we should 
note the vast influence that gold shares have on the All Share 
Index. For this reason the JSE All Share Index may display 
atypical behaviour when compared to other .international indices. 
Thus, it may be more meaningful to compare the Industrial Index 
(and not only the All Share Index) to international indices. It 
may lead to closer comparisons, since the Industrial Index is 
free from the effects of the Gold Index, which is unique to South 
Africa. In addition, some of the international studies3 are 
conducted on their industrial indices, and not their all share. 
indices. 
The results of test one can be summarised as follows: 
- Nil returns appear not to exhibit any particular pattern 
across different weekdays. 
- On the All Share and Industrial Indices, the number of 
positive returns exceed the number of negative returns on 
all days, EXCEPT Mondays. 
- The Gold Index shows the number of negative returns 
exceeding the number of positive returns on all days, 
except Wednesdays. 
- The Gold Index appears to show atypical behaviour, and 
thus it may be more meaningful to compare the JSE 
Industrial Index to the international indices - due to the 
influence of gold shares on the All _Share Index. 
4.2 Calculation of average returns for each weekday 
The second test involves the calculation of returns on a day to 
day basis. This test yielded the following results on the 
indices: 
Table G 
Second test - Average returns on the indices 
DAY OBSERVATIONS ALL SHARE :INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 374 -0,03706 -0,06324 0,091043 
Tuesday 388 0,025965 0,090197 -0,09678 
Wednesday 389 0,162345 0,162766 0,138515 
Thursday 383 0,101329 0,131432 0,027792 
Friday 375 0,048466 0,056678 0,039607 
TOTAL 1909 0,060948 0,076612 0,039950 
The first point to note is the lower number of Friday and Monday 
observations, as can be seen in the second column of Table G. 
This is explained by the larger number of public holidays on 
3For example Fields (1931), and Rogalski (1984) conducted 












these two days, which can be observed in Table A of Chapter 
Three. The information contained in Table G is presented in bar 
graph format below, (see Graph 1) since it gives a clearer visual 

















AVERAGE RETURNS ON THE INDICES 






Table G and Graph 1 clearly indicate the negative Monday return, 
on the All Share and Industrial Indices. It is interesting that 
there appears to be no abnormally high Friday return, as was 
observed in most of the international studies. Instead, the 
highest return is observed on Wednesdays. In fact, Friday's 
return ranks after both Wednesday and Thursday. Thus the negative 
Monday return is present, but the high Friday return has shifted 
to Wednesday. These results are consistent with Bhana's {1985) 
study on the All Share Index for the period 1978 - 1983. Thus the 
pattern of returns across weekdays has not changed over the last 
fifteen years. Wednesday still has the highest return followed 
by Thursday, Friday and Tuesday. Monday has the only negative 
return. 
The high Wednesday return is not unique, since it was noted in 












no comment, his results on the S & P composite portfolio indicate 
that Wednesday's returns are significantly positive at the 0.5% 
level and Thursday's returns are significantly positive at the 
5% significance level. Lakonishok and Levi (1982) note "an 
additional puzzling result is the abnormally high returns on 
Wednesdays for the entire period and earlier subperiods. 11 Board 
and Sutcliffe's (1988) study of the Financial Times All Share 
Index shows that Wednesday's returns are significantly positive 
at the 1% level. 
Again the atypical behaviour of the Gold Index is noted - the 
lowest return is on Tuesday, and not Monday. Tuesday is also the 
only day of the week which has a negative return. This is very 
clearly illustrated in Graph 1. It is interesting to note that 
despite the Gold Index having a larger number of negative returns 
(see Table F), the average return per day of the week is positive 
- (except on Tuesdays.) Another anomaly with the Gold Index is 
that not only is Monday's return not negative, but it is also the 
second highest return of the week! In the case of the Gold Index, 
it appears as if the Monday effect has shifted to Tuesday. 
studies on the s & P composite, Dow Jones Industrial Average and 
Financial Times All Share indices all show Tuesdays having a 
positive return. The negative Tuesday return on the Gold Index 
has been observed in other international studies. For example, 
Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) comment "In one respect, the data 
are different from previous studies of daily seasonals. The 
lowest mean returns for both the Japanese and Australian indices 
occur on Tuesday. The average Tuesday return for both these 
countries is significantly different from the overall average 
return on the other days of the week. This phenomenon is 
puzzling since it is not found in past studies on the U.S., and 
we do not observe it for either Canada or the U.K." Board and 
Sutcliffe (1988) note on the study of the Financial Times All 
Share Index that "it is interesting to note that, although U.S. 
treasury bills show a Weekend Effect, ••• U.K. gold returns do 
not." A later study performed by Solnik and Bousquet (1990) on 
the Paris Bourse showed "a strong and persistent negative mean 
return on Tuesday." 
What is common between the All Share, Industrial and Gold Indices 
is that the highest return occurs on Wednesdays. 
Thus the results of test two can be summarised as follows: 
- Negative returns are witnessed on Monday for the All 
Share Index and Industrial Index. This correlates with 
international observations of a negative Monday return. 
However, negative returns are observed on Tuesdays in the 
case of the Gold Index. The Gold Index appears to exhibit 
atypical behaviour. 
- All indices display the highest return on Wednesdays, 
which appears to contradict international studies - showing 
their highest returns on Fridays. It seems that there is no 
Weekend Effect on the JSE. 
The returns on the Gold Index are, on average, 













4.3 Returns - pre and post SAFEX introduction 
It is interesting to sub-divide the study period into the time 
before the introduction of the South African Futures Exchange 
(SAFEX), and the period after the introduction of SAFEX. SAFEX 
came into operation on 1 April 1990. Thus daily returns on the 
indices are evaluated for the period prior to 1 April 1990, and 
the period after 1 April 1990. The results are as follows: 
Table H 
Daily returns on the indices - pre & post introduction of SAFEX 
ALL SHARE :INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST 
Monday -0.0799 0.01378 -0.080 -.04 -0.48 0.256 
Tuesday 0.04103 0.00763 0.0777 0.11 0.014 -0.23 
Wednesday 0.23202 0.07535 0.2120 0.10 0.196 0.069 
Thursday 0.13311 0.06193 0.1662 0.09 0.074 -0.029 
Friday 0.09700 -0.0101 0.0754 0.03 0.077 -0.005 
In Table H, PRE indicates returns on a daily basis for the period 
26/2/86 to 1/4/90, while POST indicates the period after the 
introduction of SAFEX (ie 1/4/90 to 29/9/93). It will be noted 
that prior to the introduction of SAFEX, all indices displayed 
a negative Monday return and positive returns for the other days 
of the week. The negative Monday return is well documented on the 
international markets. Thus it appears as if the indices 
behaviour on Mondays, prior to the introduction of futures in 
South Africa, was the same as the international markets. However, 
it was only common as regards the negative Monday return. There 
is no Weekend Effect, since there is no high Friday return. There 
is evidence of a Midweek Effect, as Wednesdays appear to exhibit 
abnormally high returns in comparison to the other weekdays. 
After the introduction of SAFEX, the pattern of returns across 
the days of the week change quite dramatically for the Gold and 
All Share Index. Table H shows that the Industrial Index still 
has a negative Monday return, while other weekdays show positive 
returns. In addition the Industrial Index still appears to 
exhibit a Midweek Effect, with Wednesday being the highest return 
of the week. However, the pattern of returns for the Gold Index 
changes quite dramatically. The negative Monday return has 
disappeared - in fact it is now the largest positive return of 
the week! Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays (in descending order) 
now show negative returns. Thus after the introduction of SAFEX, 
the negative return for Mondays has shifted to Tuesdays. In 
addition, Monday is now the highest return of the week, and 
Thursdays and Fridays have changed from positive to negative 












Share Index. We note that in the POST period the negative Monday 
return on the All Share Index has shifted to Friday, and all of 
the other weekdays display positive returns. There is still clear 
evidence of a Midweek Effect. 
Sub-division of the database into PRE and POST SAFEX has yielded 
some interesting observations which can be summarised as follows: 
- Prior to the introduction of SAFEX, all indices displayed 
a negative Monday return. This observation is common to 
international day-of-the-week studies for U.S. and U.K. 
- The introduction of SAFEX had no impact on the pattern of 
returns for the Industrial Index. However, it had the 
following effects on the Gold Index: 
1. The negative Monday return shifted to Tuesday. 
2. Thursday and Friday changed from positive to 
negative returns. 
3. Mondays now display the largest positive return. 
- The All Share Index's negative Monday return shifted to 
Friday. This is due to the impact of the Gold Index. 
- PRE and POST SAFEX periods show a Midweek Effect, with 
Wednesdays having abnormally large positive returns. 
From the above, it would appear as if the Industrial Index 
coincides with international observations of a negative Monday 
return. However, there appears to be no abnormally high Friday 
return, but there does appear to be an abnormally high Midweek 
Effect. The high Midweek Effect has not been noted in other 
international studies. The Gold Index appears to exhibit atypical 
behaviour (after the introduction of SAFEX) in comparison to U.S. 
and U.K. observations, since it displays negative returns on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. The negative Tuesday return has 
been documented in studies of the Australian and Japanese share 
markets. The reasons for this can only be speculated upon, and 
could form the topic of further studies in this field. (It may 
be that the Australian market is also influenced by gold shares, 
and thus the negative Tuesday return is due to a gold market 
effect. This still does not explain the negative Tuesday return 
on the Japanese market.) 
4.4 variance of returns for each weekday· 
However, there is no point in considering returns in isolation. 
one needs to consider the risk versus reward relationship. It may 
be that lower returns are associated with lower risk, and that 
higher returns are associated with higher risk. In this exercise 
returns need to be adjusted for risk. Risk is measured by means 
of variability. That is, the more variable a particular day's 
return, the greater the risk associated with that day. 
The following table gives an indication of the risk pertaining 
















Variance of Returns across the Weekdays 
DAY ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 1,791265 1,145883 5,838672 
Tuesday 1,472713 1,042541 4,454806 
Wednesday 1,289123 0,676423 5,457507 
Thursday 1,075835 0,522344 5,124855 
Friday 0,994430 0,565853 4,404606 
AVERAGE 1,328717 0,796240 5,061178 
The first point that is very evident from Table I is the high 
volatility of the Gold Index in COir).parison to the All Share and 
Industrial Indices. This is yet another manner in which the Gold 
Index differs from the All Share and Industrial Indices, and can 
be seen very clearly in Graph 2. 
GRAPH 2 






Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
What is of interest is the manner in which the variability in 












this rule is the variability of the Gold Index on Tuesday, which 
appears to be the second lowest variance of the week. It will be 
remembered that Tuesday is also the lowest return for the Gold 
Index - thus the negative return may be in response to the lower 
level of risk on Tuesdays. An additional point to note is that 
the returns for the Industrial and All Share Index are the lowest 
on Mondays - in fact Monday yields negative returns. Yet, these 
low returns do not appear to be off set by lower levels of 
volatility. Quite the contrary - the lower returns appear to be 
associated with higher levels of volatility/risk. 
What is also of interest is the difference in volatility between 
the Industrial and Gold Index. The Gold Index is on average 6,4 
times more volatile than the Industrial Index, while the returns 
on the Industrial Index are on average 1,9 times higher than the 
Gold Index! This is quite phenomenal. 
It appears that the pattern of volatility of returns has changed 
from the time at which Bhana (1985) performed his tests. Bhana 
noted that Thursdays exhibited the highest volatility followed 
by Monday, Wednesday, Tuesday and Friday. The most notable 
occurrence has been the decrease in the volatility of Thursday's 
return. 
Results regarding the variability in returns between the indices 
can be summarised as follows: 
The Gold Index has a higher volatility than the 
Industrial Index. 
- Variability in returns decreases from Monday to Friday, 
except for the Gold Index where Tuesday's variance is the 
second lowest of the week. (Almost equal to the low Friday 
variance.) 
- It appears that the excess returns on Wednesday are not 
a reward for bearing extra risk. It appears that an extra 
component of return is added to a regular trading day. This 
observation corresponds to Ariel's (1990) results where he 
documented a pre-holiday high. "Despite the much higher 
return, the pre-holiday variance of return is no larger 
than the return variance for all other days; means and 
variances do not increase proportionately." 
4.5 Risk-adjusted returns 
To this point returns and variance have been considered in 
isolation. In order to combine these two aspects into one 
measure, risk-adjusted returns need to be considered. This can 
be achieved by dividing daily returns by the standard deviations4 
of these daily returns. (Refer to equation {la} in Chapter 
4Standard deviation is the square root of the variance. As 
was mentioned in chapter three, the exercise of dividing return 
by the standard deviation adjusts all returns to have a common 
variance of one. In this manner returns are comparable, since 












Three.) In this manner daily returns are made more comparable, 
since returns and variance appear to show a weekday effect, and 
one should never consider returns without considering the 


































RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS ON THE INDICES 

























of returns across the days of the week does not alter. The only 
observation that may be made is that the difference between 
returns on the different indices is more pronounced. This is 
particularly evident when Wednesday returns are considered. In 
Graph 1 it is noted that the returns for the different indices 
are roughly comparable. However, in Graph 3 the risk-adjusted 
returns are very different. It is clear that on Wednesdays the 
Industrial Index has the highest risk-adjusted return and the 
Gold Index has the lowest risk-adjusted return. Assuming a risk 
averse investor, one would expect more people to invest in the 
Industrial Index. However, the premium on options on the Gold 
Index will be higher than premiums on the Industrial Index, due 
to the higher volatility of the Gold Index. 
Thus adjusting for risk has not altered the pattern of returns 
across the week, and has not had a significant impact on the 
Weekend Effect. 
4.6 statistical significance of returns 
Monday is the only day to exhibit a negative return - apart from 
the Gold Index, where the negative return shifts to Tuesday. 
However, this pattern may not be statistically significant. In 
order to evaluate the statistical significance of differences in 
returns across days of the week, it is necessary to compute the 
t-statistics for the indices. In addition Bhana's (1985) results 
(which were based on the All Share Index only) are reproduced in 








T-Statistics for the indices5 
ALL SHARE BRANA'S INDUSTRIAL 
-0,5355 -2,0151 -1,1425 
0,4215 0,1106 1,7401 
2,8201 1,4230 3,9032 
1,9119 0,8355 3,5590 







Based on his results in Table J, Bhana concluded that Monday's 
exhibited significantly negative returns at the 2,5% confidence 
level. However, there was no evidence of a significantly positive 
Friday effect. It was noted that Wednesday's showed a 
significantly positive return at the 10% level. 
5 The t-statistics have been calculated as follows: 
t-stat=x-U/s(x)where,s(x) =s/..[ii. 












What is of interest is the manner in which Bhana calculates his 
t-statistic. Based on his data, the t-statistics were 
recalculated, (using on the formulae in footnote 5) and the 
following values were arrived at for Monday to Friday: -1,6219 
1,4872 3,6307 2,2822 2,5332. 
Based on the recalculated t-statistics, the following conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly the negative Monday return can only be 
confirmed at the 5,5% significance level. In addition, the high 
t-statistic values for Wednesday, Thursday and Friday mean that 
these day's returns are significantly positive at the 0,1%, 2,5% 
and 10% levels respectively Basically, returns are 
significantly positive on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Friday's 
returns are only significantly positive at the 10% level. 
Closer scrutiny of Bhana's results indicate that his returns are 
far greater than this studies' returns for all days of the week. 
From this comparison, it appears as if returns on the indices 
have dropped fairly significantly from the period that Bhana 
studied to this study period. 
The author contacted Bhana due to the discrepancy between his t-
sta tistic values and the t-statistic values that this study 
calculates based on his data. He wrote back and indicated that 
he had "checked the t-statistic values that you provided and 
hereby confirm that your calculations are correct. The t-
statistic values appearing in ••• my paper are not correct. Please 
use the t-statistics as calculated by yourself instead of those 
reported in my paper. " As an additional test, this study 
determined if Bhana had perhaps calculated his t-statistic as 
being significantly different from some value other than zero. 
This calculation did not shed any additional light on the 
problem. Thus the conclusions drawn by Bhana appear to have been 
based on the incorrect t-statistics. This implies that for his 
study period there was no significantly negative Monday effect. 
In addition, it would appear as if there was a significantly 
positive Wednesday and Thursday return on the All Share Index. 
The t-statistics (for this studies data period) shown in Table 
K indicate that returns on the All Share Index are significantly 
positive on Wednesdays and Thursdays and possibly Fridays -
returns are only significantly different from zero at the 20% 
confidence level on Friday. (This is not considered to be a very 
significant level). The confidence level increases to 5% on 
Thursday, and 1% on Wednesday. Monday's return can only be said 
to be significantly negative at the 30% confidence level. These 
results are at odds with most international findings and Bhana's 
original conclusions. When Bhana's t-statistics are recalculated, 
his results and this studies' results are very similar. The only 
changes from Bhana' s study are that the significance of the 
negative Monday and positive Friday return have decreased. 
Based on this study period, it would appear as if the JSE shows 
significantly positive returns on Wednesdays and Thursdays on the 
All Share Index. The Industrial Index results show that Monday's 












Wednesday and Thursday's returns are all significantly positive 
above the 5% confidence level. The amazing observation is that 
the Wednesday and Thursday's returns are positive at the 0,1% 
confidence level. The t-statistics on the Gold Index indicate 
that the daily returns are not significantly different from zero 
on any particular day. Tuesday's returns can be said to be 
negative at the 20% confidence level, whereas Wednesday's returns 
can be said to be positive at the 15% confidence level. These 
confidence levels are not sufficiently precise to conclude that 
returns on the Gold Index are significantly different on any one 
of the weekdays. 
What emerges from these statistics is that the JSE does not 
appear to trace most international markets with the negative 
Monday return and the positive Friday return -ie the Weekend 
Effect. The JSE shows significantly positive returns on 
Wednesday's, and this may, ironically, be some form of a Midweek 
Effect. 
However, previous exercises have ignored public holidays. This 
assumes the trading time hypothesis to be correct - i.e. that 
returns are only generated during trading time. Holidays were 
eliminated from the data set in order to investigate what impact 
they have on the study of day of the week effects. That is to say 
the exercise was reperformed, except that the return for the day 
after the public holiday was eliminated from the data set. The 
return for the day after the holiday had previously been 
calculated by comparing it to the day before the public holiday. 
This implies an investment of at least two calendar days. 
The same tests were performed on the modified data, but the 
results were not found to be significantly different. The t-
statistics for the modified data set are presented below. 
Table L 
T-statistics for the indices adjusting for public holidays 
DAY ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday -0,7123 -1,3850 0,6657 
Tuesday 0,6218 1,9532 -0,7368 
Wednesday 2,9660 3,9990 1,3264 
Thursday 2,1187 3,7017 0,4067 
Friday 1,0544 1,3906 0,5539 
These results clearly illustrate that the pattern of a 
significantly positive Wednesday and Thursday returns do not 
disappear when public holidays are eliminated from the data. For 
the sake of completeness, the other results from the study of the 
modified data are included in Appendix B. They have not been 
included in the body of the study, since they do not show any 












Results of the t-statistic tests can be summarised as follows: 
- There does not appear to be a significantly negative 
Monday return, or a positive Friday return. Thus there does 
not appear to be a Weekend Effect on the JSE. This is at 
odds with most of the international findings discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
- There appears to be a significantly positive return for 
Wednesdays and Thursdays. This will be referred to as the 
Midweek Effect. 
- The Gold Index once again exhibits atypical behaviour by 
not displaying any returns as being significantly different 
from zero. (This is measured against a 95% confidence 
level.} 
4.7 Tests on Calendar and Trading time hypotheses 
The negative Monday return implies that neither the trading time 
or calendar time hypotheses off er an adequate explanation of the 
manner in which returns are generated on the JSE. It will be 
remembered that if returns are generated in calendar time, then 
Monday's return would be three times as great as the return on 
any other weekday, since Monday represents a three calendar day 
investment Saturday, Sunday and Monday. If returns are 
generated in trading time, then Monday's return will be equal to 
the returns on all of the other days of the week. French (1980} 
used regression techniques to formally evaluate these two 
hypotheses. Regression analysis is also. used in this study. 
Equations {2} and {3} from Chapter Three are used, which are the 
same equations used by French. 
The regression for the trading time hypothesis (equation { 2}} was 
performed on Lotus. The results for the three indices are 
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Regression output for indices based on the Trading Time 
Hypothesis 
Regression Output: 
No. of observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
ALL SHARE INDEX 
1909 
1904 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday 
(Constant) 
Parameter 
Estimate -0.03706 0.063027 0.199407 
Stndized 
Estimate 0.0000 0.0220 0.0679 
Standard 
Error 0.05958 0.083495 0.083442 
t-stat 
(b=O) -0.62 0.754862 2.389757 
Prob. 
Level 0.5339 0.4503 0.0169 
F-stat 0.3844 0.569817 5.710938 
Seq. 
R-Sqr 0.0002 0.0020 
Simple 
R-Sqr 0.0002 0.0020 
Analysis of variance report: 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square 
(Sequential) 
Constant 1 7.091356 7.091356 
Model 4 8.749856 2.187464 
Error 1904 2527.772 1.327611 
Total 1908 2536.521 1.329414 
Root Mean Square Error 1.15222 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0009483 
Coefficient of Variation 18.90487 
R Squared 0.0034 























Regression output for indices based on the Trading Time 
Hypothesis 
Regression Output: INDUSTRIAL INDEX 
1909 No. of observations 




Estimate -0.06324 0.153439 
Stndized 
















-1.37 2.378914 3.50622 
0.1694 0.0174 0.0005 
1.8769 5.659232 12.2935 












source df Sums of Squares Mean Square F-ratio Prob. Level 
(Sequential) 
Constant 1 11. 2049 
Model 4 11. 57405 
Error 1904 1508.448 
Total 1908 1520.022 
Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Coefficient of Variation 
R Squared 






















Regression output for indices based on the Trading Time 
Hypothesis 
Regression output: 
No. of observations 




Monday Tuesday Wednesday 
(Constant) 
Parameter 
Estimate 0.91043 -0.18783 0.048472 
Stndized 
Estimate 0.0000 -0.0336 0.0087 
Standard 
Error 0.116409 0.163135 0.163032 
t-stat 
(b=O) 0.78 -1.15138 0.297317 
Prob. 
Level 0.4342 0.2429 0.7662 
F-stat 0.6084 1.325675 0.088310 
Seq. 
R-Sqr 0.0009 0.0012 
Simple 
R-Sqr 0.0009 0.0005 
Analysis of variance report: 
Source df sums of Squares Mean Square 
(Sequential) 
Constant 1 3.046821 3.046821 
Model 4 12.14376 3.03594 
Error 1904 9649.647 5.068091 
Total 1908 9661.79 5.063831 
Root Mean Square Error 2.251242 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.03995034 
Coefficient of Variation 56.35101 
·R Squared 0.0013 























The results of the regression analysis based on the trading time 
hypothesis, leads to the following conclusions: 
All Share Index 
An analysis of the results for the All Share Index once again 
shows the negative Monday return, while the returns for the rest 
of the weekdays are positive (See the Parameter estimate row). 
However, when one looks at the t-statistics and probability 
levels for each weekday, it will be noted that for all days 
(EXCEPT Wednesday) the null hypothesis can be accepted (ie b=O). 
This implies that the difference between Mondays return and the 
other weekdays is NOT significantly different at the 5% level. 
However, it will be noted that for Wednesday the hypothesis is 
rejected at the 2% significance level. This indicates that there 
is a high Midweek Effect which has already been referred to in 
this chapter6 • 
The F-stat from the analysis of variance report shows that the 
trading time hypothesis can be accepted, since daily returns at 
a joint significance level are not different from each other. 
Thus there is evidence to support the trading time hypothesis. 
Industrial Index 
Regression analysis indicates a stronger negative Monday effect, 
with the other weekdays exhibiting positive returns. The t-
statistics and the associated probability levels indicate that 
the null hypothesis (returns are not significantly different from 
Monday) can be rejected at the 2% significance level. 7This 
clearly indicates a Midweek Effect with Wednesday's return 
differing from Monday's return at the 0.5% level! 
The analysis of variance report shows an F-ratio of 3.65. This 
indicates the trading time hypothesis for the Industrial Index 
is rejected at the 2% significance level.It would appear that 
returns on the Industrial Index are not generated in trading 
time. 
Gold Index 
The negative Tuesday return is shown from the regression 
analysis. It will be noted that t-stat values across all of the 
weekdays lead to the conclusion that the trading time hypothesis 
can be accepted. (Note that all of the probability levels are 
well in excess of the 5% level of significance.) 
6It should be noted that the trading time hypothesis is 
rejected at the 10% level for Thursdays as well. However, this 
result is only added as a footnote, since 10% significance allows 
for a relatively large margin of error. 
7The difference between Thursday's and Monday's return can 












It comes as no surprise that the F-ratio for the model as a whole 
leads to the acceptance of the trading time hypothesis. It 













Regression output for indices based on the Calendar Time 
Hypothesis 
Regression Output: ALL SHARE INDEX 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
{Constant) 
Parameter 
Estimate -0.0124 0.02597 0.1623458 0.101329 0.04847 
Stndized 
Estimate -0.0142 0.0101 0.0635 0.0393 0.0186 
Standard 
Error 0.01986 0.05850 0.05842 0.05888 0.05950 
t-stat 
{b=O) -0.62 0.44 2.78 1.72 0.81 
Prob. 
Level 0.5339 0.6571 0.0055 0.0852 0.4153 
F-stat 0.3844 0.1936 7.7284 2.9584 0.6561 
Seq. 
R-Sqr 0.0002 0.0003 0.0043 0.0059 0.0062 
Simple 
R-Sqr 0.0002 0.0001 0.0040 0.0015 0.0003 
Analysis of variance report: 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square F-ratio Prob. Level 
{Sequential) 
Constant 0 0 0 
Model 5 15.84121 3.168242 2.39 0.036 
Error 1904 2527.772 1.327611 
Total 1909 2543.613 1.332432 
Root Mean Square Error 1.15222 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.06094831 
Coefficient of Variation 18.90487 
R Squared 0.0062 











Regression out:gut for indices based on 
Hy:gothesis 




Estimate -0.0211 0.09020 
Stndized 
Estimate -0.0313 0.0454 
Standard 
Error 0.01534 0.04519 
t-stat 
(b=O) -1.37 2.00 
Prob. 
Level 0.1694 0.0459 




















Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Coefficient of Variation 
R Squared 












































Regression out gut for indices based on the Calendar Time 
Hygothesis 
Regression Outgut: GOLD INDEX 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
{Constant) 
Parameter 
Estimate 0.03035 -0.0968 0.1395155 0.02779 0.03961 
stndized 
Estimate 0.0179 -0.0194 0.0280 0.0055 0.0078 
Standard 
Error 0.03880 0.114289 0.11414 0.11503 0.11625 
t-stat 
(b=O) 0.78 -0.85 1.22 0.24 0.34 
Prob. 
Level 0.4342 0.3971 0.2216 0.8091 0.7333 
F-stat 0.6084 0.7225 1.4884 0.0576 0.1156 
Seq. 
R-Sqr 0.0003 0.0007 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 
Simple 
R-Sqr 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 
Analysis of variance report: 
Source df Sums of Squares Mean Square F-ratio Prob. Level 
{Sequential) 
Constant 0 0 
Model 5 15.19058 
Error 1904 9649.647 
Total 1909 9664.837 
Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Coefficient of Variation 
R Squared 






















The results of the regression analysis based on the calendar time 
hypothesis, leads to the following conclusions: 
All Share Index 
It will be noted that returns for Monday are approximately one-
third of the trading time hypothesis returns. This is to be 
expected, since the calendar time hypothesis postulates that 
Monday's return should be three times any other weekday's return. 
T-statistics and probability levels indicate that the calendar 
time hypothesis is accepted on all weekdays EXCEPT Wednesday. In 
the case of Wednesday the calendar time hypothesis is rejected 
at the 2% significance level. 8 
The analysis of variance report indicates that the calendar time 
hypothesis should be rejected at the 5% significance level. 
Industrial Index 
The t-statistics and associated probability levels indicate that 
the calendar time hypothesis should be rejected at the 5% level 
for Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. 9 
The F-ratio for the calendar time model as a whole clearly shows 
that the calendar time hypothesis does not provide an adequate 
explanation as to how returns are generated on the Industrial 
Index. 
Gold Index 
T-stat results from the regression run on the Gold Index indicate 
that the calendar time hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of 
the weekdays. In addition, the F-stat indicates that the calendar 
time hypothesis for the model as a whole cannot be rejected. 
8The calendar time hypothesis for Thursdays is also rejected 
at the 10% significance level. 
9The calendar time hypothesis is rejected for Wednesdays on 













Summary of results of regression analysis to test the Trading 
and Calendar time hypotheses 
TRADING TIME CALENDER TIME 
ALL IND GOLD ALL IND GOLD 
Tuesday A R A A R A 
Wednesday R R A R R A 
Thursday A R A A R A 
Friday A A A A A A 
OVERALL A R A R R A 
Table M summarises the results of the regression analysis 
performed on the three indices for the calendar time and trading 
time hypothesis. "R" indicates that the hypothesis should be 
rejected, while "A" indicates that the hypothesis should be 
accepted. It should be noted that the daily results (Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) refer to the t-statistics and 
probability levels. These results reflect whether there is a 
significant difference between the day in questions return and 
Monday's return. The OVERALL row in Table M refers to whether the 
trading or calendar time hyp thesis should be accepted or 
rejected for the index as a whole. {ie Does the trading or 
calendar time hypothesis off er an adequate explanation of the 
manner in which returns are generated on the All Share Index, 
Industrial Index or Gold Index?) 
The daily return results ( ie rows 1-4, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday) indicate that, for both the calendar and 
trading time hypotheses, Friday's returns are not significantly 
different from Monday's returns. It appears as if there is no 
evidence of a Weekend Effect on the JSE. While there is evidence 
of a negative Monday return, there is no evidence of an 
abnormally high Friday return. These results show that share 
prices drop from the Friday close to the Monday close, but that 
prices do not to increase significantly from the Thursday close 
to the Friday close. 
The OVERALL row indicates whether the model should be accepted 
or rejected as a whole. The trading and calendar time hypotheses 
do not appear to provide an adequate explanation for the return 
generating process on the Industrial Index. This corresponds with 












hypotheses10 • The calendar time hypothesis is rejected for the 
All Share Index, while the trading time hypothesis is accepted. 
Thus there appears to be limited evidence to support the trading 
time hypothesis on the All Share Index11 • These results indicate 
that weekends are effectively ignored in the return generating 
process for share markets - no returns are generated over 
weekends. However, there can be no doubt that interest is earned 
over weekends and public holidays for any interest bearing 
instrument. Thus "a calendar time view is relevant for interest 
bearing securities" (ie Bonds, or fixed deposits) (Lakonishok & 
Levi, 1982). The above evidence suggests that returns on the All 
Share Index are generated in trading time, while in theory 
returns on any interest bearing security are generated in 
calendar time. 
Results on the Gold Index are somewhat perplexing since they 
indicate that both the trading and calendar time hypotheses are 
acceptable. The reasons for this can only be speculated upon, and 
could form the basis for future research. One could postulate 
that a large proportion of gold shares making up the Gold Index 
are traded on international markets, and thus their returns are 
generated twenty four hours per day. This would imply that for 
shares traded internationally the returns are generated in 
calendar time, while shares not listed on international markets 
are only traded in trading time. Thus the Gold Index is a hybrid 
of shares traded both internationally (calender time) and locally 
(trading time). For this reason it may be that both the trading 
time and calendar time hypotheses are accepted for the Gold 
Index. 
4.8 Returns adjusted for settlement effects 
It will be remembered from Chapter Three that the settlement 
period for shares purchased on the JSE will vary according to the 
day on which the shares are purchased. There can be little doubt 
that in theory the settlement effect should be adjusted for, 
since interest is earned in calendar time (Lakonishok & Levi, 
1985). The settlement period prior to 30 May 1991 was fourteen 
business days. This would imply (refer to Table C in Chapter 
Three) that shares purchased on Mondays and Tuesdays would result 
in an eighteen calendar day settlement period. This would consist 
of fourteen business days and two weekends. However, shares 
purchased on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays would result in 
a twenty calendar day settlement period. This was due to the fact 
10see French (1980) who studied the s & P composite portfolio 
in U.S., Theobald & Price (1984) who studied the Financial 
Times(FT) Ordinary and FT All Share indices in U.K., Jaffe & 
Westerfield (1985) who studied the Nikkei Dow {Japan} Toronto 
Stock Exchange Index {Canada} and the Statex Actuaries Index 
{Australia}. 
11This supports the findings of Davidson & Meyer (1993) on 
the All Share Index. Their study only came to the authors 
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that an extra weekend fell between purchase and settlement. Thus 
the twenty day settlement period consisted of fourteen business 
days and three weekends (ie six weekend days). Clearly any 
Wednesday, Thursday or Friday transaction would result in the 
purchaser earning an additional two days of interest on his/her 
money before having to settle. The converse is that the seller 
would have an opportunity cost of selling on the last three days 
of the week. This opportunity cost would be equal to two days of 
interest. In a weak-form efficient market one would expect share 
prices to compensate for this uneven settlement period. The share 
prices should adjust upwards by two days of risk free interest 
on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. This would cause an 
abnormally large return on Wednesday, since Wednesday's closing 
value is compared to Tuesday's closing index value. In addition, 
it would cause a low or negative Monday return since Monday's 
return is calculated by comparing it to the closing value of the 
index on Friday. These comments appear to explain the high 
Midweek and negative Monday returns that are documented in this 
paper. The potential bias that settlement effects may have on 
return patterns needs to be adjusted for. This could be achieved 
by subtracting two days of interest from the Wednesday, Thursday 
and Friday closing index values. However, a more efficient method 
is to adjust Wednesday returns downwards by two days of interest 
and adjust Monday returns upwards by two days of interest. This 
is done since returns are calculated according to equation {l}, 
and thus the index value is always compared to the preceding day. 
If the preceding day already has the interest factor grossed into 
it, then there is no need to adjust the return for that day. 
It will be remembered that the settlement period changed from 
fourteen business days to seven business days on 30 May 1991. 
This implies that the settlement effect tends to cause a high 
Friday and low or negative Monday return after the 30 May 1991 -
refer to Table D in Chapter Three. After 30 May 1991, Friday's 
returns need to be adjusted downwards by two days of interest, 
and Monday returns need to be adjusted upwards by two days of 
interest. 
The required adjustment is made by obtaining the Bankers 
Acceptance Rate (BA Rate) on a daily basis for the period under 
study. The fact that this study uses a daily interest rate is an 
improvement on previous studies (Lakonishok & Levi, 1985) which 
used an average interest rate for the study period. South Africa 
has witnessed extremely volatile interest rates. In the seven and 
a half year study period the BA rate reached a high of 18,3% and 
a low of 8,2%. It is less accurate to perform the adjustment 
using an average rate with such volatile interest rates. In 
addition, by using the daily interest rate, we are not assuming 
that interest rates are even across all weekdays. (It may be that 
interest rates also exhibit day of the week patterns. To assume, 
as other studies have done, that interest rates are on average 
even across all weekdays is dangerous.) The adjustment for 













Average returns adjusted for settlement effects 
DAY ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 0,038806 0,012626 0,166910 
Tuesday 0,025965 0,090197 -0,09678 
Wednesday 0,098099 0,098520 0,075269 
Thursday 0,101329 0,131432 0,027792 
Friday 0,024933 0,033146 0,016074 
The adjustment performed in Table N makes the weekdays more 
comparable, since it removes the potential bias caused by an 
uneven settlement period. Wednesday and Monday returns have been 
adjusted for prior to 30 May 1991. Friday and Monday returns have 
been adjusted for after 30 May 1991. It is noted that the 
negative Monday return on the All Share Index, and Industrial 
Index has disappeared. This because Monday returns have been 
adjusted upwards by two days of interest, due to delays between 
transaction date and settlement date. In addition the magnitude 
of the positive Wednesday return has declined when the interest 
effect is removed. It appears as if the negative Monday and 
positive Wednesday, that have been documented in this study, are 
a function of settlement delays. 
It is noted that all returns on the All Share and Industrial 
Indices are positive. It appears that Thursdays now exhibit the 
highest return of the week. After the adjustment for settlement 
delays, the Gold Index still displays a negative Tuesday return. 
What is of interest is that Monday now displays the largest 
return of the week. Calculation of the t-statistics based on the 
returns adjusted for settlement delays is presented in Table o. 
Table o 
T-statistics based on returns adjusted for settlement delays 
DAY ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 0,5607 0,2281 1,3359 
Tuesday 0,4215 1,7401 -0,90327 
Wednesday 0,70408 2,3626 0,870684 
Thursday 1,9119 3,5590 0,2403 
Friday 0,3850 0,6313 0,1471 
Table O confirms the observation that the Gold Index appears to 
show no clear pattern across the week. · T-statistics indicate 
that, at the 5% confidence level, non of the returns are 
significantly different from zero. Thus once returns are adjusted 












different from zero on any of the weekdays. These results support 
the trading time hypothesis. However, despite the downward 
adjustment to Wednesdays for settlement effects, the returns are 
still significantly positive at the 1% level on the Industrial 
Index. The Industrial Index still has a significantly positive 
Thursday return at the 0,5% level. This once again appears to 
indicate a Midweek Effect on the Industrial Index. There is no 
doubt that a portion of the abnormally high Wednesday return can 
be explained away by the bias caused by settlement delays. 
However, not all of the excessive return can be explained by the 
uneven settlement period. The All Share Index shows that only 
Thursdays returns are significantly positive at the 5% confidence 
level. 
Returns adjusted for settlement delays hav~ been divided into two 
time periods - the period prior to 30 May 1991, and the period 
after 30 May 1991. These two periods relate to the fourteen and 
seven business day settlement period. The results have been 
presented in Appendix c. 
Settlement delays can be summarised as follows: 
- There can be no doubt that uneven settlement periods 
should be adjusted for. 
- After the adjustment for settlement delays, it is noted 
that the Gold Index does not exhibit any significant day of 
the week effect. The day of the week effect previously 
noted can probably be ascribed to settlement effects. 
- After adjusting for settlement delays the Industrial 
Index still exhibits a strong Midweek Effect. This is 
witnessed by Wednesday returns being significantly positive 
at the 1% level, and Thursday returns being significantly 
positive at the 0,5% level. However, settlement delays do 
explain a large portion (approximately 60%12 ) of the 
Midweek Effect. 
- The All Share Index shows no strong day of the week 
effect after the adjustment for settlement delays. 
(Thursday returns can be said to be positive at the 5% 
significance level. This is almost· certainly due to the 
influence of the Industrial Index.) 
4.9 Returns adjusted for dividend effects 
Another factor which impacts on the pattern of daily returns is 
the LOR. The LOR is the day on which shares go ex-dividend. A 
transaction on LOR implies that the purchaser obtains the 
dividend, while the seller has no right to the declared dividend. 
A share that changes hands on the day after LOR trades ex-
dividend. Thus the purchaser has no right to the dividend, while 
the seller has full legal title to the dividend, despite the fact 
that the investor has sold the share prior to actual payment 
12Lakonishok and Levi ( 1982) found that the settlement effect 
accounted for about 20% of the weekend effect. Board and 
Sutcliffe (1988) found that it accounted for about 40% of the 













It is not necessary to adjust for the impact of dividends, if 
LDR's show no distinct pattern across weekdays. However, if one 
day of the week is typically the day on which share's LDRs fall, 
then it implies that returns for the day after the LDR need to 
be adjusted for. This is because share prices will, in theory, 
drop by the amount of the dividend on the day after LDR. The "ex 
dividend effect will produce a negative return for the day the 
share goes ex dividend, proportional to the size of the lost 
dividend" (Board & Sutcliffe, 1988). The amount of the adjustment 
is equal to the dividend yield attributable to that particular 
index, since the dividend effect "is governed by the size of the 
dividend lost" (Board & Sutcliffe, 1988). 
The LDR's for the All Share Index were obtained for the top forty 
shares on the All Share Index. These can be found in Appendix D. 
It will be noted from Appendix A that the top forty shares 
account for more than 75% of the All Share Index. Based on the 
results of Appendix D, it can safely be assumed that the LDR is 
not spread evenly across all weekdays. In fact there is very 
clear evidence that the LDR for shares on the JSE falls on a 
Friday. These results correspond to Levett's (1991) observation 
that "nearly all companies LDR dates fall on a Friday.'' This 
observation comes as no real surprise, since "in common with many 
stock exchanges, most shares ••• have last days to register on 
the last trading day of the week" (Davidson & Meyer, 1993). This 
is confirmed by Board and Sutcliffe's study of the Financial 
Times All Share Index, where the dividend adjustment is made to 
Monday's returns. This is due t  the fact that the LDR on the 
London markets also falls on a Friday. 
The fact that the LDR shows such a clear weekday effect, implies 
that returns must be adjusted for. Since it can be concluded that 
the LDR for at least 75% of the All Share Index falls on a 
Friday, Monday's return must be increased by the dividend yield 
attributable to the All Share Index. This is because shares with 
an LDR on Friday trade ex-dividend on Monday. Thus the share 
prices drop on Monday by the amount of the dividend. (In theory 
the price should drop by the present value of the dividend. For 
the purposes of this study the difference between present value 
and actual dividend value is considered to be negligible.) This 
means that the closing value of the index on Monday is lower due 
to the LDR falling on Friday. To adjust for this, Monday's return 
must be increase by the value of the dividend yield on the index. 
This methodology is also used by Davidson and Meyer (1993) where 
"the additional gain from the dividends were then added to the 
return for the first trading day of the following week." The 
process of obtaining the dividend yield on the indices is common 
to that used by Board and Sutcliffe. The monthly dividend yield 
on the indices is obtained, and from this the average dividend 
yield for each of the years in the study period is calculated. 
The results of this exercise are presented in Appendix E. These 
results are used to compute the average dividend yield for the 
entire period. The average dividend yield is used to adjust 












for dividends, are presented in Table P. 
Table P 
Average returns adjusted for dividend effects 
DAY OBSERVATIONS ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 374 -0,02665 -0,05427 0,10441 
Tuesday 388 0,025965 0,090197 -0,09678 
Wednesday 389 0,162345 0,162766 0,138515 
Thursday 383 0,101329 0,131432 0,027792 
Friday 375 0,048466 0,056678 0,039607 
TOTAL 1909 0,060948 0,076612 0,039950 
Comparison of Table P to Table G indicates that Monday returns 
have been adjusted upwards for the effect of the ex dividend. It 
can be seen that the negative Monday return on the All Share and 
Gold Index has not disappeared, but has been reduce by a 
significant amount. In fact, the dividend effect explains 28% and 
14% of the negative Monday return on the All Share and Industrial 
Indices respectively. 
4.10 Simultaneous adjustment for interest and dividend effects 
In practice all of the potential influences on the closing index 
values, and therefore returns, work in combination. Thus all of 
these factors need to be adjusted for simultaneously. This 
exercise performs such a test by adjusting for interest effects 
and dividend effects concurrently. The results of such a test are 
presented in Table Q. 
Table Q 
Average returns adjusted for settlement and dividend effects 
DAY ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 0,049217 0,021694 0,180280 
Tuesday 0,025965 0,090197 -0,09678 
Wednesday 0,098099 0,098520 0,075269 
Thursday 0,101329 0,131432 0,027792 
Friday 0,024933 0,033146 0,016074 
Table Q shows returns adjusted for settlement delays and ex-
dividend effects. Monday returns have been increased due to the 
ex-dividend effects, while Wednesday returns have been adjusted 
downwards and Monday returns adjusted upwards for settlement 
delays. (After 30 May 1991, Friday returns and not Wednesday 












delays.) These adjustments have no impact on the conclusions 
drawn under sections 4.8 and 4.9. This is because dividend and 
settlement effects only simultaneously impact on Monday returns. 
T-statistics calculated for Monday (0,7112; 0,3919; and 1,4429 
for the All Share, Industrial and Gold Indices respectively) 
still do not make its return significantly different from zero. 
Thus it can be concluded that the negative Monday return on the 
JSE can be ascribed to settlement delays and ex-dividend effects. 
4.11 Summary of Chapter Four 
Chapter Four deals with the empirical results from the 
econometric tests described in Chapter Three. These tests were 
performed on the closing values of the All Share, Industrial, and 
Gold Indices. This is the first time that such a study has been 
performed on indices other than the All Share Index. This 
represents a significant improvement on previous studies, since 
it analyses day of the week effects on each of the indices 
separately. In addition, some of the international studies were 
carried out on industrial indices, and thus the results on the 
Industrial Index can be compared to these studies. 
The first test showed that the number of positive returns 
exceeded the number of negative returns on all weekdays, EXCEPT 
Mondays, on the All Share and Industrial Indices. The Gold Index 
displayed the opposite pattern, with the number of negative 
returns exceeding the number of positive returns on all weekdays, 
EXCEPT Wednesdays. This was the first sign of a high Midweek 
Effect. 
The second test calculated the average returns on each of the 
weekdays. What is interesting is that the results from test one 
on the All Share and Industrial Indices carried over to test two. 
That is to say that average returns were positive on all days, 
except Mondays. However, despite negative returns exceeding 
positive returns on the Gold Index, the average returns on all 
weekdays was positive, except Tuesdays. Thus there is evidence 
of a negative Monday return on the All Share and Industrial 
Indices, and a negative Tuesday return on the Gold Index. 
Another interesting feature of the study is the high Wednesday 
return on all of the indices. This high Midweek Effect is not a 
compensation for additional risk, since the variance in returns 
decreases across the week from Monday to Friday. T-statistics 
indicated that there is no significant negative Monday, or 
positive Friday, and thus there is no Weekend Effect on the JSE. 
However, the t-statistics do indicate a Midweek Effect, as 
Wednesday's returns are significantly positive. (At the same 
time, it was discovered that the t-statistics used by Bhana 
(1985) had been incorrectly calculated. Thus the conclusions 
reached in his study cannot be relied upon. Once the recalculated 
t-statistics are used, his results confirm this studies 
findings.) 
Regression analysis is used to test the calendar and trading time 












time hypothesis provides an acceptable explanation to the manner 
in which returns are generated on the All Share Index. However, 
both hypotheses are rejected for the Industrial Index. Results 
on the Gold Index are puzzling, since they indicate that both the 
trading and calendar time hypotheses provide acceptable 
postulates as to how returns are calculated on this index. 
The chapter then focuses on potential biases caused in returns 
due to, amo·ngst other things, settlement delays and ex-dividend 
effects. It is noted that the settlement effect contributes to 
the negative Monday return and positive Wednesday return. In 
addition, calculations show that ex dividend effects contribute 
to the negative Monday return. Once these factors are adjusted 
for, the negative Monday return vanishes, and the abnormally high 
Midweek Effect diminishes. 
Consequently it can be concluded that the negative Monday return 
is almost certainly due to rational investors factoring 
settlement and ex-dividend effects into Monday share prices. Once 
·these have been adjusted for the negative Monday return 
disappears. The large portion of the high Midweek Effect can 
almost certainly be ascribed to the rational investors factoring 
settlement delays into Wednesday share prices. However, 
settlement delays do not fully explain this Midweek Effect, and 
















This chapter concludes on the study of day of the week share 
return patterns on the JSE. The contributions and improvements 
upon previous research is discussed. The significant results from 
this study are summarised, and conclusi'ons are drawn. 
Unfortunately not all aspects in this field of study can be 
adequately covered due to the shortage of data availability and 
limitations on the scope. Thus, suggestions as to where future 
research can improve and enhance on this study are also 
discussed. 
s.2 contributions of this study 
The purpose of this study is to determine if the JSE equity 
indices exhibit similar empirical anomalies to those found on 
other stock exchanges. These anomalies relate to the distribution 
of share returns across weekdays. To date no viable explanation 
to these anomalies has been documented. This paper is a follow-up 
to the study conducted by Bhana {1985) on the JSE. As such it 
fulfils Bhana's recommendation that follow-up studies should be 
conducted as more computer based information becomes available. 
However, apart from updating Bhana's results, it also improves 
and expands upon his research in several significant areas. 
This study was conducted on the All Share Index, Industrial Index 
and Gold Index, while Bhana's study was limited to the All Share 
Index. Investigation of the sub-indices allows one to determine 
whether gold shares have a unique impact on day of the week share 
return patterns. In addition, Bhana's study did not investigate 
any possible explanations to the Weekend Effect. This paper 
analyses international literature on the subject, and utilises 
these studies to try and obtain an explanation to day if the week 
effects on the JSE. 
A unique aspect of this study is that it includes the period over 
which the futures exchange was introduced to the South African 
markets. As such it is possible to establish whether the futures 
market has impacted on the pattern of intraweek share returns. 
Most research on the JSE assumes that share returns· are even 
across the weekdays. This study shows that this assumption does 
not correlate with the empirical evidence. Thus future research 
must take this studies' results into consideration. This study 
also improves upon international studies, as daily interest rates 
are used to adjust for settlement delays, whereas international 
studies use average interest rates. The use of daily interest 












the week effects in interest rates. 
5.3 Summary of findings 
The All Share and Industrial Indices display negative Monday 
returns similar to U.K. and U.S. share markets. The Gold Index 
displays negative Tuesday returns1 , which have been documented 
in Japan and Australia by Jaffe and Westerfield (1985). Thus the 
pattern of Gold Index returns appear to be atypical in comparison 
to the All Share and Industrial Indices. What is, however, common 
between the indices is the high Wednesday return. The high 
Midweek Effect has not been documented in international research. 
This indicates that while the JSE has a negative Monday, it does 
not have a Weekend Effect. The negative Monday and high Wednesday 
returns correspond to Bhana's (1985) results on the All Share 
Index. This indicates that the pattern of returns on the JSE has 
not changed over the last decade. 
The variance of returns decreases from Monday to Friday, except 
for Tuesday's Gold Index variance, which is the second lowest of 
the week. However, the pattern of returns does not alter, even 
after returns have been adjusted for risk. Based on t-statistics 
only Wednesday and Thursday returns on the All Share and 
Industrial Indices are significantly positive. 
Regression analyses testing the trading and calendar time 
hypotheses indicate that the trading time model is acceptable for 
the return generating process on the All Share Index. However, 
both hypotheses do not appear to provide an adequate explanation 
of the return generating process on the Industrial Index. 
This result corresponds with several international studies which 
reject both the calendar and trading time hypotheses. The results 
on the Gold Index are somewhat perplexing since they indicate 
that both hypotheses ar  acceptable. A few possible explanations 
for this are discussed in Chapter Four, but further investigation 
of these results could form the basis for future research. 
During the study period the settlement period changed from 
fourteen to seven business days. In order to adjust for the 
effects of delayed settlement, two days of interest is deducted 
from Wednesday's return and added to Monday's return2 • 
After adjustmenting for settlement delays, the results show that 
the negative Monday return has disappeared. Thus it appears as 
1It should be noted that the Gold Index had a negative 
Monday return prior to the introduction of SAFEX. It was only 
after the introduction of SAFEX that the negative Monday return 
shifted to Tuesday. 
2After 30 May 1991, it was Friday's, and not Wednesday's 
returns, that were adjusted downwards by two days of interest. 
This was due to the settlement period changing from fourteen to 












if the negative Monday return is the result of uneven settlement 
delays. In addition it is found that the All Share and Gold 
Indices display no significant day of the week effect after 
adjusting for settlement delays. 
Dividends may affect the pattern of intraweek returns, should the 
LDR systematically fall on any one particular weekday. This is 
due to the effects of shares trading ex-dividend on the day after 
LDR. This research shows that the LDR tends to systematically 
fall on a Friday. To adjust for the potential bias in the 
results, due to the effects of dividends, Monday returns are 
adjusted upwards by the average dividend yield on the respective 
index. Adjusted returns indicate that dividends explain 28% , 14% 
and 15% of the negative Monday return for the All Share 
Industrial and Gold Indices. 
When settlement effects and dividend effects are adjusted for 
simultaneously, it is found that the All Share and Gold Indices 
display no significant day of the week effect. Settlement delays 
explain the Midweek Effect on the All Share Index, while a 
combination of the settlement effect and the dividend effect 
explain the negative Monday return. However, the Midweek Effect 
remains an unexplained anomaly on the Industrial Index. 
5.4 Areas for Future Research 
Due to a lack of data availability this study was unable to 
determine whether the negative Monday return accrues during trade 
on Monday or over the non-trading weekend. Only when opening 
index values are available, will it be possible to perform this 
test. Should opening index values be calculated in the future, 
a follow-up study should be conducted to determine whether the 
negative Monday return is a function of the non-trading weekend 
or trade on Monday. 
Recent international research has focused on intraday trading 
patterns. At present such a study is not possible, as index 
values are only calculated at 16HOO. However, if at some future 
stage intraday index values become available, then tests similar 
to those performed on international stock exchanges should be 
carried out on the JSE. 
International research has also carried day of the week and 
intraday studies over to the options and· futures markets. This 
study is unaware of any such research having been carried out on 
SAFEX. It is recommended that future research imitate 
international research on the futures market. In this manner day 
of the week effects on the futures market can be compared to day 
of the week effects on the share market3 • 
3SAFEX has futures contracts are based on the All Share 
Index, Industrial Index and Gold Index, which are referred to as 













The JSE exhibits day of the week effects in share returns. 
However, there. does not· appear to be a Weekend Effect as 
documented on several international stock exchanges. In fact, the 
JSE exhibits a Midweek Effect, with Wednesday displaying a 
significantly positive return. Even after· adjusting returns for 
risk, settlement delays and dividend effects, the Midweek Effect 
is not eliminated. 
While the Midweek Effect remains an unexplained anomaly, it does 
not contradict the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
This is because once trading costs are accounted for, any 
potential profits are eliminated. Consequently any trading 
strategy based upon day of the week trading patterns will not be 
profitable. However, the research shows that share sales that 
have already been decided upon should be timed to take place on 
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1. 25% 65. 96% 
1.24% 67.20% 
1. 20% 68. 40% 
1.13% 69. 53% 






















1Weight of share in the All Share Index. 













APPENDIX A (Continued) 
49 Western Deep 0.55% 87.38% 
50 FIT 0.54% 87.92% 
Major contributors to the Industrial Index 
1 S A Breweries 10.65% 10.65% 
2 Richemont 8.37% 18.72% 
3 Rembrandt 6.71% 25.43% 
4 Sasol 5.82% 31.25% 
5 Amie 4.58% 35.83% 
Major contributors to the Gold Index 
1 Drief ontein 20.82% 20.82% 
2 Vaalreef s 14.86% 35.68% 
3 Freegold 14.21% 49.89% 
4 Kloof 12.85% 62.74% 













Standard Deviations for the study where public holidays have 
been eliminated 
DAY NO. ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
OBSERVATIONS 
Monday 360 1,3454 1,0813 2,4170 
Tuesday 370 1,2106 1,0302 2,1043 
Wednesday 382 1,1307 0,8222 2,3183 
Thursday 375 1,0385 0,7279 2,2646 













Average returns up to 30/5/91 adjusted for settlement effects 
DAY ALL SHARE :INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 0,042956 0,024182 0,051683 
Tuesday 0,034196 0,091215 -0,00918 
Wednesday 0,136944 0,132972 0,102388 
Thursday 0,089157 ' 0,149589 -0,00043 
Friday 0,048886 0,060534 -0,00952 
Average returns after 30/5/91 adjusted for settlement effects 
DAY ALL SHARE :INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
Monday 0,029689 -0,01275 0,420016 
Tuesday 0,007805 0,087952 -0,29009 
Wednesday 0,048248 0,058634 0,052022 
Thursday 0,129001 0,090153 0,091958 

















































































































































































2These represent the days of the week on which the shares 
have their LDR's. 
3The interim LOR falls on a Sunday. For statistical 
procedures it will have the same impact as if the share's LOR 
falls on a Friday, since this is in practice the last day that 













Percentage dividend yields on the All Share, Industrial and 
Gold Indi-ces 
YEAR ALL SHARE INDUSTRIAL GOLD 
1986 4,31 3,55 5,83 
1987 3,66 3,03 4,43 
1988 4·, 89 4,11 6.02 
1989 3,88 3,44 4,99 
1990 3,74 3,68 4,14 
1991 3,50 2,93 4,42 
1992 3,39 2,58 5,30 
1993 3,05 3,19 3,9 
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